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Introduction 
"Recognizing the threat Iraq's non-compliance with 
Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and long-range missiJes poses to 
international peace and security ... " 
(UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 
2002.) 
"The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with 
the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one 
issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons 
of mass destruction as the core reason ... " 
(Paul Wolfowitz in interview with Sam Tannenhaus of 
Vanity Fair 9 May 2003.) 1 
For about fifteen years the international community has 
been struggling with the issue of Iraq's actual or presumed 
weapons of mass destruction. At least ten Security Council 
resolutions have been devoted to the problem, and two 
governments have issued voluminous dossiers on the issue. 
After the 2003 war against Iraq, four commissions of 
investigation have published altogether about 2500 pages of 
findings about the topic. But were weapons of mass 
destruction the real issue? Was it perhaps, as Martin 
Woollacott wrote in the Guardian Weekly after the war, 
Saddam Hussein who in a sense came to be seen as "the 
f d . ",' weapon 0 mass estructlon .-
This study will attempt to retrace the story of Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction from the years before the first 
Gulf War, and the efforts of the international community 
1 Reprinted by United States Department of De:fcnseINcws Transcripts 
[on line 22 Aug 2005J. 
') .Martin Woollacon, "Spies obsessed by SaJdam", Guardian Weekly, 5-
11 February 2004. 
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since J 991 to contain and eliminate the Iraqi regime's ability 
to develop and use such weapons.3 In so doing we shall also 
make an effort to look into the developing situation as seen 
from "the other side of the hill", by the regime in Iraq. To 
what extent did Iraq cooperate with the UN inspectors prior 
to the 2003 war? Why did Iraq not fully cooperate with the 
UN Security Council if they had nothing to hide? Was Saddam 
Hussein's power and prestige the stumbling block? Was the 
regime as monolithic as generally portrayed in western media? 
As intelligence played a crucial part by providing the 
groundwork for western assessments of the threat, we shall 
attempt to investigate what UN inspectors and the US and UK 
intelligence agencies knew or thought they knew about 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and how that intelligence 
came to be used by their political masters. A central question 
in what follows will be whether or to what extent the overtly 
discussed issue of weapons of mass destruction became a foil 
for a determination to remove Saddam Hussein and his 
regime, and, if so, how far the leading member states of the 
international community were prepared to go for that 
purpose. 
It is necessary, when reviewing the process that led to the 
war, to avoid reading history backwards. Comments and 
discussions in the media and among the public after the event 
have inevitably been coloured by what we now know or think 
we know. We now know, or think we know, that there were 
no stocks of weapons of masS destruction in Iraq. We also 
know that there was a disastrous lack of planning for the 
post-campaign phase, whose bloody and violent aspects have 
since dominated the media. In spite of isolated warnings, 
nothing of this was known or assumed by those who 
participated in the process that led to the decision for war. 
Wisdom after the event is difficult to avoid. But unless one 
3 For a more detailed analysis of the experiences of the work of the United 
Nations Special Commission 1991-1998 sec Malfrid Hraut-
Hcgghammer, "Disarming Iraq? The United Nations Special 
Commission 1991-98". Forsvarsstltdier, no. 4 (Oslo: The Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies, 2004), 
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makes an effort to enter into the situation as it presented itself 
to the decision-makers at the riJne, the account becomes 
skewed - or more skewed than it has to be. 
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Chapter 1 
Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction before the 1991 
Gulf War 
Before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the international 
community saw Iraq's development and use of non-
conventional warfare capabilities as a regional problem and 
treated it accordingly. One important reason for this was that 
during the 19805, the Iraqi Baathist regime was considered an 
extremely valuable ally in US-led efforts to contain the 
revolutionary Iranian regime. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's 
use of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles was a crucial 
element in its efforts to resist the Iranian forces. Iraq's 
systematic use of these weapons ensured that these capabilities 
and their role in Iraqi military strategy during the 1980s Was 
known by the outside world. Despite Iranian protests, the 
international community, including the United Nations, failed 
to punish Iraq's use of chemical weapons although this 
violated the 1925 Geneva Convention. During the 1980s, 
several countries supplied Iraq with equipment and materials 
used to develop its ballistic missile and chemical warfare 
capabilities. This process went largely unnoticed, partly 
because neither the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
nor any international control system capable of systematically 
detecting and tracking suspect exports had been established. 
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Existing information and analyses offer several clues to 
why Iraq was pursuing non-conventional weapons 
capabilities. Although the question why the Iraqi regime 
sought to acquire WMD cannot be answered in full, it is 
possible to identify important elements in its motivations, key 
triggering events and reasons for the use and deployment of 
these weapons. Iraq's early efforts to pursue non-conventional 
warfare capabilities appear to have been motivated by 
political ambitions inspired by Nasserite pan-Arabism and the 
desire to draw on technology to create "modern" warfare 
capabilities.4 Between 1980 and 1988, the Iran-Iraq war 
transformed Iraq's view of the potential role of chemical and 
biological weapons. This war became the catalyst that 
triggered the establishment of an industrial-scale chemical 
warfare production capability, efforts to develop large-scale 
production of biological weapons agents, and indigenous 
"reverse engineering" to create long-range ballistic missiles 
that enabled the Iraqis to strike directly at Teheran. 
Iraq's efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons 
capabilities were fundamentally motivated by the objective of 
securing the regime's survival against domestic and regional 
threats. One of the main lessons rh at the Iraqi regime drew 
from the Iran-Iraq war was that chemical warfare capabilities 
and ballistic missiles would play a key role in any future 
efforts to counter the numerically superior Iranian forces. 
Iraqi documentation suggests that an important longer-term 
objective for obtaining biological and chemical weapons was 
that they could serve as a deterrent against Israel and its 
nuclear weapons.5 In interviews with UNSCOM, Iraqi 
officials admitted that chemical and biological weapons were 
viewed as "interim" deterrents until Iraq obtained a nuclear 
4 For example, Charles Duclfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special 
Adl,jsor to the DCI 011 Inlq's \vAiD. Central Intelligence Agency, 
Washington D.e.: 30 September 2004, voJ. 3, p. 5. 
5 Note from "senior Iraqi official" to Saddam Husscin written in 1988, 
quoted in UNMOVIC Twelfth quanerly report (2003), p. 5. 
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weapons capability. Iraq also used chemical weapons 
repeatedly against domestic rebellions, particularly during the 
final stages of the Iran-Iraq war. 
The biological weapons programme began as a small, 
highly compartmentalized effort. Despite having been initiated 
years earlier, it was not until the mid-1980s that the biological 
weapons programme became a serious undertaking. The use 
of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war was judged a 
success, and this may have been an important factor behind 
Iraq's reinforced efforts in the biological weapons 
programme.6 In 1986, Iraq initiated a "5-year plan" to 
become able to weaponize biological agents? The following 
year, after Iran's refusal of Iraq's offer of a cease-fire, attempts 
were made to move towards large-scale production of 
biological agents.8 In the same year Iraqi scientists also 
investigated the porential of developing biological agents as an 
economic weapon, capable of damaging an opponents' 
(presumably Iranian) wheat harvests.9 
It is difficult to identify an exact starting point for the Iraqi 
efforts to aquire nuclear weapons. According to one former 
Iraqi nuclear scientist, from the early 1970s individuals were 
playing with the idea of "going nuclear". In the 1970s, certain 
countries became increasingly alarmed by the Iraqi civilian 
nuclear programme and feared thar this could be a cover for 
an effort to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons capability. 
Since 1979 Israel had been undertaking a number of efforts to 
prevent Iraq from acquiring a nuclear reactor. This campaign 
culminated in June 1981 when Israeli strikes destroyed Ira9's 
nearly completed nuclear research reactor, dubbed Osiraq. 0 
After the attack, a clandestine programme to develop nuclear 
weapons through uranium enrichment was established. ll 
These efforts were based on indigenous resources and 
6 Duelfcr, Comprehensiul! Report ... , Va!. 3, "Biological Warfare", p. 8. 
7 Ibid. 
8 UNMOVIC twelth quarterly report (2003), p. 6. 
9 UNMOVIC twelth quarterly report (2003), p. 152. 
10 Jafar D. Jafar and Lus Sigurd $unnana, Oppdraget: II11lsidel1l51oriel1 
om Saddallls atOl1lllapelt (Oslo: Spartacus forlng 2005), pp. 52-53. 
11 Duelfer, Comprehcl1siuc Report ... , vol. 2, "Nuclear"'. p. 3. 
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capabilities. This reduced the risk of detection as well as Iraqi 
reliance on external actors to obtain the necessary items and 
know-how to proceed with the nuclear weapons programme. 
Iraq's subsequent efforts to develop uranium enrichment 
were not uncovered by other countries. The destruction of 
Osiraq denied Iraq the option of pursuing a nuclear weapon 
via the plutonium route, and the outside world seemingly did 
not believe that nuclear weapons programme could emerge in 
Iraq under such circumstances. Some countries also tended to 
underestimate Iraq's scientific ingenuity and achievements in 
the area of NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons 
programmes. Iraq's attempts to develop a nuclear weapon 
through indigenous reSOUfces, and their efforts at 
concealment, ensured that the programme was successfully 
kept secret from the outside world for several years. For 
example, Iraq successfully managed to conceal "telltale" signs 
of its uranium enrichment activities at the facilities where this 
was being carried out.!2 It was only in the late 1980s that 
some procurement activities began to raise suspicions about 
developments in the nuclear field in Iraq. 
During and after the Iran-Iraq war, the outside world 
knew little about Iraq's capabilities, efforts and achievements 
in its pursuit of non-comventional warfare. Although the war 
had demonstrated that Iraq could develop indigenous 
industrial-scale chemical warfare capabilities and increase the 
range of their SCUD missiles, Western intelligence 
underestimated Iraq's efforts to establish indigenous biological 
warfare capabilities. Western intelligence also remained 
largely oblivious regarding the direction, scope and 
achievements of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. 
After the Iran-Iraq war ended, Iraq endeavoured to further 
develop its chemical, biological and nuclear weapon 
programmes in order to establish a retaliatory capability that 
could deter its regional enemies and enhance its status in the 
Middle East. From 1988 onwards Iraq increased the 
12 "'Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment", IISS 
Strategic Dossier, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2002), p.l? 
WERE WMDs THE REAL ISSUE? 17 
infrastructure as well as the research and development 
activities of its biological weapons programme, with the 
objectiveof developing lar~~-scale production capabilities for 
biological weapon agents. 0 In August 1990, after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein 
Kamel, gave orders to those leading the nuclear and the 
biological weapons programmes to develop weapons as soon 
as possible, though neither programme was fully capable of 
doing so at that stage. One week before the Gulf War in 1991, 
biological weapons were deployed at four locations. The 
United Nations later found evidence indicating that biological 
weapon agents, which had not been filled into weapons, had 
been placed in the field. 
Following the invasion of Kuwait, the West began to 
consider Iraq's pursuit of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapon capabilities as a threat with international 
implications, partly because these capabilities would heighten 
the threshold for intervention in response to further Iraqi 
aggression in the Middle East. However, it now seems that the 
Iraqis did not consider that their existing chemical and 
(rudimentary) biological weapons capabilities would be 
effective weapons against the highly mobile and 
technologically advanced coalition forces. 14 It would thus 
appear that the Iraqi deployment of these weapons prior to 
the invasion of Kuwait was intended to provide an ultimate 
retaliatory capability in response to a nuclear attack from 
Israel or the United States. In that context, it is important that 
Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, undertaken with the objective 
of dividing the coalition, were conducted only with 
conventional warheads. IS While Israel was clearly considered 
a regional enemy by the Iraqi regime, it appears that the Iraqi 
leaders were deterred from attacking Israel with non-
conventional weapons. In their substantive report, the Iraq 
13 UNMOVIC twelch quarterly repoft (2003), pp. 153-154; pp. 157-159. 
H Rolf Ekeus, '"Iraq's Real Weapons Threat", Washington Post, 29 June 
2003. 
15 John Pike, "Nuclear threats during the Gulf war", E-prints, 19 February 
(Federation of American Scientists [ollline 26 Aug 2005]. 1998), 
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Survey Group (ISG) referred to recent interviews with Saddam 
Hussein, in which he allegedly stated that chemical and 
biological weapons were not used in the 1991 Gulf War 
because Iraq did not want to risk alienating its supporters.1 6 
However, such reservations did not apply with respect to 
quelling domestic challenges to the regime in 1991, when Iraq 
used chemical weapons against Shiite rebels while coalition 
f . I 17 orces were 10 t le country. 
Prior to 1991, intelligence gathering and analysis of Iraq's 
pursuit of WMD faced considerable challenges in attempting 
to detect secret and highly compartmentalized activities such 
as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. 
These challenges were amplified by inadequate means of 
intelligence gathering, over-reliance on satellite imagery and 
limited information about Iraqi imports and their end-users. A 
central question is why Iraq's intentions and/or capabilities 
concerning biological and nuclear weapons were 
underestimated prior to 1991. A large part of the explanation 
is probably that this issue was not considered as a threat of 
international proportions and was therefore given a low 
prioriry in the context of intelligence (with the exception of 
Israel). The targeting of the coalition's bombing raids in the 
1991 Gulf War reflected what was known about Iraq's WMD 
programmes and capabilities. Perhaps predictably, precision 
bombing damaged several of Iraq's chemical weapons 
production facilities. However, it later became clear that these 
attacks did not cause as much damage as the coalition 
believed in 1991.18 With regard to Iraq's biological weapons 
programme, only one site, Sal man Pak, was targeted by 
coalition precision bombing.19 In the nuclear area, coalition 
16 Duclfer, CompreiJcl1Sil'c Report ... , \'01. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
68. 
17 Duclfer, Comprehensive Report. .. , val. 3, "Iraq's Chemical \\7arfarc 
Program", p. 5. 
1 S Jean E. Krasno and James S. Suttcrlin, The United Natiolls and Iraq: 
Dc{al1gillg the Viper (Wescport: Praegcr Ilublishers, 2(03), p. 166. 
19 Rod Barton, "The Application of the UNSCOM c-xpcrience to 
International Biological Arms Control", Critical reviews ill 
Microbiology, 24:3 (1998): p. 220. 
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bombing dest.royed most. of Iraq's facilities associat.ed with the 
nuclear weapons programme. These facilities were targeted 
because t.he coalition's national intelligence services suspected 
that these sites played some part in Iraqi WMD or missile 
activities, although their precise role was not known. 
However, some ked nuclear facilities escaped destruction and 
survived the war.2 Overall, the Gulf War inflicted substantial 
damage on Iraq's WMD facilities, especially in the nuclear 
area, but did not devastate the infrastructure of Iraq's nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons programmes. 
20 "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction ... ", p. 21. 
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Chapter 2 
1991-98: The Role of 
UNSCOM 
After the Gulf War in 1991, the issue of Iraqi WMD and their 
meanS of delivery emerged as a major security concern in the 
international community. The United Natioos Security 
Council's cease-fire agreement required Iraq to disarm of all 
WMD as well as associated components, subsystems and 
facilities. Further, Iraq could only produce ballistic missiles 
with a range below 150 km, thereby denying them the 
capability of reaching Teheran with these weapons.21 The 
inclusion of biological and nuclear weapons in Iraq's 
disarmament obligations in Security Council Resolution 687 
was meant to ensure that the threat associated with any 
weapons defined as WMD, whether nuclear, chemical or 
biological, was fully addressed. Despite considerable 
technological and strategic differences between these types of 
weapons, all three were included in the disarmament 
condition. Iraq's past of use chemical weapons meant that any 
such weapon in Iraqi hands was considered a threat to 
international peace and stability.22 
Two organizations, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM), were tasked with overseeing and assessing Iraq's 
21 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (199]). 
21 For it morc detailed analysis, sec Braut-Hcgghammcr, "Disarming 
Iraq? .. ". 
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compliance with these demands. UNSCOM was created to 
verify that WMD disarmament took place as required, and to 
monitor to ensure that Iraq did not rebuild proscribed 
chemical, biological and missile capabilities. lA EA was tasked 
with the same objectives and tasks concerning nuclear 
weapons. These two agencies were to account for Iraq's 
destruction of all proscribed weapons and items, and present 
regular technical assessments of this process to the Security 
Council. The Council would independently determine whether 
or not Iraq constituted a threat to international security and 
stability. This "division of labour" was based on a clear 
distinction between the tasks of technical disarmament 
accounting and political threat assessment. 
Although Iraq declared substantial amounts of chemical 
weapons and ballistic missiles 1991-94, and destroyed these 
under United Nations' supervision, it was clear from the 
outset that Iraq's compliance was far from complete. 
Although Resolution 687 obliged Iraq to declare its past 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes and 
holdings, Iraq's declarations were demonstrably incomplete 
and selective in content. Further, instances of Iraqi obstruction 
of IAEA inspections made it clear that Iraq was seeking to 
deny access to, and hide items from United Nations 
inspectors. These demonstrations of Iraqi non-compliance led 
to additional United Nations resolutions and statements 
condemning these actions and demanding more Iraqi 
cooperation. Further, despite its obligations under Resolutions 
687 (1991) and 715 (1991), until November 1993 Iraq 
refused to allow UNSCOM to establish a monitoring system 
to ascertain whether Iraq was subsequently rebuilding 
proscribed capabilities. 
In the late summer of 1991 Iraq destroyed large amounts of 
ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons 
unilaterally. This was not reported to the United Nations, in 
direct contravention of the requirements of Resolution 687. 
These weapons, and related items that could be used to 
produce proscribed weapons, had initially been retained, but 
then destroyed in secret when the Iraqi regime realized that 
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the United Nations inspectors could detect Iraqi efforts to hide 
prohibited itcms.23 Moreover, UNSCOM and IAEA gradually 
uncovered that Iraq had not declared the most advanced and 
recent developments in its WMD programmes. In fact, Iraq 
had not declared its clandestine nuclear weapons programme 
or its uranium enrichment activities to the IAEA. Iraq also 
failed to declare its biological weapons programme, although 
it did concede to having undertaken research for hio-defence 
purposes. Iraq only admitted to the existence of a biological 
weapons programme on 1 July 1995, following an intensive 
UNSCOM investigation. The unravelling of the Iraqi 
biological warfare programme after years of steadfast Iraqi 
denials, and the realization that Iraq had maintained (and 
improved) the main biological weapons facility (AI Hakam) 
under a civilian cover since 1991, seriously undermined the 
Iraqi regime's credibility and the prospect of lifting the 
sanctions against Iraq at that stage. 
Only one month later, in August 1995, the defection of 
Hussein Kamel (leader of the Iraqi Military Industrial 
Commission and Saddam Hussein's son-in-law) led to turning 
point in the United Nations inspectors' approach to assessing 
and verifying Iraqi cooperation and compliance. Iraqi 
attempts to "pre-empt" disclosures by Hussein Kamel, by 
giving UNSCOM and IAEA information about undeclared 
activities and systematic non-cooperation over the past four 
years, combined with Kame!'s statements to United Nations 
inspectors, led to the uncovering of systematic proscribed Iraqi 
actions since 1991. This also provided more detailed 
information about the Iraqi biological weapons programme, 
including weaponization, the chemical weapons programme 
and Iraq's efforts to enrich uranium. Furthermore, evidence of 
proscribed actions, such as the unilateral destructions of 1991 
and the fact that efforts to develop proscribed ballistic missiles 
had continued since 1991, led to a more suspicious approach 
to assessing Iraqi declarations and a more intrusive and 
scrutinous verification system.24 
13 Duclfer, Comprehe1tsiJle Report ... , vol. 3, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare 
Program", p. 31. 
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These discoveries - particularly regarding Iraq's clandestine 
nuclear weapons programme - also had a significant impact 
on how intelligence communities assessed Iraq's WMD 
disarmament. The realization that they had substantially 
underestimated Iraqi efforts to pursue nuclear and biological 
weapons gave rise to a teodency to increasingly assume that 
Iraq was continuing to deceive them and hiding proscribed 
weapons, materials and capabilities from United Nations 
inspectors.25 The British and American intelligence 
communities increasingly assumed that a number of weapons 
and items that UI\SCOM had classified as "unaccounted for" 
- issues that could not be resolved for a number of different 
reasons, and thus were not fully verifiable - still existed and 
remained hidden in Iraq. 
Following the revelations that emerged after the Hussein 
Kamel defection, Iraq admitted to having withheld 
information that should have been declared with the objective 
of retaining proscribed WMD capabilities, weapons and items. 
A number of different activities that were suspected of being 
undertaken with this in mind were subsequently categorized as 
being part of an Iraqi "concealment mechanism".26 It now 
seems likely that several of the activities suspected of being 
part of this mecbanism resulted from the Iraqi regime's 
enduring obsessiun with security. This manifested itself, for 
example, in trying to ensure that the international inspectors 
could not identify Saddam Hussein's whereabouts, map the 
Iraqi security apparatus or assess Iraq's conventional military 
capabilities. This "mechanism" increasingly became a point of 
concern because significant gaps remained in the material 
accounting for Iraq's WMD and associated items even after 
24 
26 
For a more detailed analysis, sec Braut-Hegghammcr, "'Disarming 
Iraq? ... " 
Report 011 the V.S. Intelligence Commullity's Prewar Intelligellce 
Assessments 011 Iraq. United States Senate, Select Commirtee on 
Intdligcm:c (\V'ashingwl1 D.e.: 7 July 2004), frequently rcfcHcJ LU a ... 
the Senate Inre1ligcncc Committee report; Richard Butler, The Greatest 
Threat: lmq, \Ilea/JailS of ,Mass Destructioll, and the Crisis of Global 
Security (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), p. 112. 
For a more in~depth analysis: Braut~Hegghammer, "Disarming Iraq? .. ", 
p.68. 
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years of inspections. Indeed, during 1997-98 the 
"concealment mechanism" itself became the focus of a 
number of highly confrontational UNSCOM inspections, 
targeting sites defined as "sensitive" by the Iraqis, such as 
presidential palaces. 
Iraq's limited cooperation, and evidence of subversive 
efforts such as hiding proscribed weapons and equipment, 
misrepresenting their WMD capabilities and achievements as 
well as threatening United Nations inspectors, fuelled 
suspicions that Iraq did not intend to give up its WMD 
capabilities. Iraq's seemingly incremental approach to 
declaring proscribed programmes and capabilities suggested 
that some items, weapons or information were "always" 
retained by Iraq. This pattern was demonstrated over a 
number of years, and was characterized as a strategy of "cheat 
and retreat" .27 Accordingly and over time, the impression that 
Iraq's declarations of WMD disarmament were "inherently" 
incomplete was established.28 
From the outset in 1991, Iraq's cooperation with the 
United Nations inspections and compliance with Resolution 
687 were perceived as limited and uneven. Iraq's cooperation 
with UNSCOM and IAEA was characterized by a mixture of 
concessions, negotiations and attempts to determine the terms 
of engagement. Iraq's incremental concessions were intended 
to satisfy the United Nations inspectors without disclosing all 
details and items associated with the proscribed programmes. 
However, they were interpreted as evidence of the 
incompleteness of Iraq's declarations and the risk that Iraq 
was continuously retaining proscribed items and weapons that 
had not been accounted for. Ultimately, the pattern of Iraq's 
partial cooperation fed doubts in Iran and elsewhere 
27 Jonathan B. Tucker, "'Monitoring and verification in a noncooperative 
environment: lessons from the UNSCOM experience in Iraq". Tbe Non-
proliferatioll Rel'ieU', Spring/Summer (1996): 8. 
28 Martin Woollacott, "Our spics were hostage to their mistrust of 
Saddam1'l, Guardian \\1eekl)" 31 January 2004. 
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concerning the extent to which Iraq was disarming of WMD, 
and the risk that Saddam intended to rebuild the proscribed 
capabilities in the future when sanctions had been lifted. 
During the seven years of United Nations inspections, Iraqi 
cooperation varied considerably. Between 1991 and August 
1995 the Iraqi regime's objective appears to have been to 
retain as much as possible of the proscribed information and 
materials as long as this did not threaten the prospect of 
having the sanctions lifted.29 Hussein Kamel appears to have 
been the main driving force behind the Iraqi efforts to retain 
WMD-related information and materials. After his defection 
in the autumn of 1995, Iraq's cooperation with the United 
Nations inspectors' efforts to map Iraq's WMD programmes 
and achievements improved substantially. During 1995-97 a 
second "disarmament round" took place,. where some retained 
proscribed items and the site that had formerly been Iraq's 
main biological weapons facility (AI-Hakal1l) were destroyed 
under the auspices of the United Nations. However, an 
important turning point came with Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright's speech at Georgetown University in 
March 1997. In this speech, Albright made it clear that the 
United States would not agree to lifting sanctions as long as 
Saddam Hussein remained in power. Subsequently, Iraqi 
cooperation with the United Nations inspectors deteriorated 
steadily. Two other noteworthy incidents had a detrimental 
impact on Iraqi cooperation and UNSCOM's confidence in 
Iraqi compliance with WMD resolution 687. First, Iraq denied 
weaponizing the chemical agent VX, yet traces were 
discovered on missile fragments in April 1997. Second, the so-
called "Air Force Document" incident in July 1998 was of 
significance. This document, that was taken away from the 
inspectors by the Iraqis at the site, seemed to suggest that Iraq 
could have omitted 6,500 chemical warheads from its 
declaration to UNSCOM. 30 
29 Duelfcr, COIll/Jrehel1siuc Report ... , vo!. 1, "Charles Duclfer's 
Transmittal message", p. 9. 
30 Dudfer, C011l/JrehellSil'c Re/JOrt ... , vol. 3, "Iraq's Chemical Warfare 
Program", p. 13. 
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Because Resolution 687 called for complete WMD 
disarmament, and UNSCOM and the IAEA had been charged 
with ascertaining ro what extent Iraq was complying with that 
objective, these agencies had to establish whether all the 
relevant materials and weapons had been destroyed. This in 
turn had to be based On a complete understanding of Iraq's 
capabilities and past efforts. Even though considerable 
progress had been made in mapping Iraq's proscribed 
programmes, by 1998 some significant gaps still remained. 
For example, Iraq never accounted for its military "concepts 
of use" for chemical and biological weapons, which would 
ha ve enabled UNSCOM to fully understand the strategic and 
military purpose of these weapons. More seriously, due to 
inadequate Iraqi declarations UNSCOM was never able to 
determine the overall scope of the biological weapons 
programme. By 1997-98, a number of questions about these 
proscribed programmes and, perhaps even more worryingly, 
efforts to conduct deception, remained unanswered. These 
uncertainties - in particular regarding past deception and 
concealment - continued to undermine UNSCOM's ability to 
verify Iraqi claims about the scope and details of its WMD 
disarmament. Although the known infrastructure of Iraq's 
WMD and proscribed ballistic missile programmes had been 
destroyed and facilities that could be rcconfigured to 
contribute to proscribed activities were being monitored, 
UNSCOM was never able ro report that Iraq had fully 
complied with Resolution 687's objective by declaring all 
aspects of their proscribed programmes and enabling them to 
verify that all items had been destroyed. 
To a great extent, the problems stemming from the 
unresolved disarmament issues resulted from a combination of 
documented Iraqi efforts to conduct deception (perhaps first 
and foremost the unilateral disarmament activities that took 
place in 1991), and Security Council Resolution 687's 
objective of "complete" Iraqi disarmament. In fact, even if 
Iraq had fully complied with this resolution from the outset it 
would still have been difficult for UNSCOM to report that 
Iraq had done so because there is no clearly identifiable 
28 FORSI'ARSSTUDIER 41100.5 
technical endpoint for "complete" WMD disarmament. While 
it is possible to interpret this objective simply in terms of the 
destruction of WMD, associated research and production 
infrastructures, the wide range of items which can be found in 
civilian industries that can be diverted for production of 
chemical and biological weapons agents makes it almost 
impossible to define and identify "complete" disarmament. 
For example, whether the potential risk posed by civilian 
activities and facilities being diverted for proscribed purposes 
is acceptable has to be considered. In the context of enforced 
WMD disarmament, this is essentially a political question 
based on assessments of intent. The definition of complete 
disarmament ultimately draws heavily on assessing whether 
Iraq was likely to rebuild proscribed WMD and ballistic 
missile capabilities. However, assessments of intent and 
threats to international peace and security are the domain of 
the Security Council and were not within the technical 
agencies' remit.31 
Despite Iraq's efforts to cooperate, and the United Nations 
agencies' substantial achievements in dismantling Iraq's WMD 
infrastructure, evidence of Iraqi non-cooperation and 
unwillingness to fully declare past WMD and proscribed 
ballistic missile efforts, capabilities and programmes in a way 
rhat could be independently verified was increasingly focused 
upon. This fed concerns about Iraq's intentions with regard to 
WMD in the longer-term, and resulted in a tendencv to 
assume worst-case scenarios.32 The issue underlying' whether 
countries were worried about the unresolved Iraqi WMD 
disarmament issues was their concern that Iraq might rebuild 
their proscribed weapons capabilities and that this might pose 
a threat to international peace and security. 
It was clear from the outset that the Security Council was 
divided on the issue of whether Iraqi non-cooperation with 
United Nations inspectors should be punished with military 
action. The disagreement on how to ensure enforcement in 
31 For a more detailed analysis, scc Braut-Hcgghammcr, "Disarming 
Iraq? .... 
\Voollacorr, "'Our spies were hostage ... " 
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relation to Iraq - with respect to military strikes and the lifting 
of sanctions - continued to weaken the Security Council's 
consensuS over the following years. In January 1993 the 
United States launched cruise missile attacks in response to 
Iraqi non-cooperation with UN inspectors, and this was 
repeated in 1993 and 1996. When instances of Iraqi non-
cooperation and obstruction began to mount in 1997-98, 
disagreement over how to respond further eroded the Security 
Council's cOnsensus and its ability to respond swiftly and 
decisively. When Iraq denied UNSCOM inspectors access to 
eight so-called "presidential" sites in January 1998, the United 
States and the United Kingdom signalled that they would 
launch missile attacks to punish Iraq. However, after UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan's visit in Baghdad in February 
1998 the crisis was resolved without punitive military 
action.33 A cooperation programme was set up whereby 
UNSCOM and Iraq would seek to resolve a number of the 
remaining disarmament issues. 
In August 1998, however, Iraq suspended cooperation with 
UNSCOM due to the top leadership's growing conviction that 
Iraq would not be able to satisfy the inspectors and that 
sanctions would not therefore be lifted.34 Despite having been 
offered a "comprehensive" sanctions review as an incentive 
for cooperation, Iraq maintained th~t it would not cooperate 
as long as sanctions were in place.3., On 31 October Iraq 
announced that it would cease all cooperation with 
UNSCOM. The United Kingdom and the United States once 
again prepared to undertake air strikes. However, these did 
not take place because Iraq decided to resume cooperation on 
14 November. The following day, US President Clinton said 
that air strikes would "mark the end of UNSCOM", leaving 
33 Tim Youngs and .Mark Oakes, "Iraq: 'Desert Fox' and Policy 
Devc!opments''', House of COl1l11l0US Library Research paper, 99/1 3, 10 
February (1999). \The United Kingdom Parliament [onlinc 26 Aug 
2005]), Summary of Main Points. 
34 Duelfer, COf11{m:hcnsille Report ... , '101. 1, "Regime Strategic Imcnt", p. 
55. 
35 "'V.N. proposes timetable for lifting ofIrnqi sanctions", CNN [onlinc 26 
Aug 2005]. 6 October 1998. 
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the United Nations with "no oversight, no ins~ht, no 
involvement with what is going on with Iraq". 3 After another 
round of inspections, UNSCOM's Executive Chairman 
Richard Butler reported to the Security Council in mid-
December that Iraq had not fully cooperated with the 
inspectors.3? On 16 December 1998 all UN weapons 
inspectors departed from Iraq immediately prior to air strikes 
launched by the United States and Britain. These strikes, 
dubbed Operation Desert Fox, lasted three days and ceased 
immediately before Ramadan. 
The United States and Britain claimed that the objective for 
the strikes was threefold: to punish Iraqi non-cooperation 
with UNSCOM, weaken Iraq's ability to make WMD and 
diminish its ability to threaten neighbouring countries. 
However, the targeting list suggests that the main result of the 
campaign was to weaken the communications of the senior 
levels of the Iraqi regime. Only 10 per cent of the targets 
attacked were designated as WMD-related targets.38 It was 
argued that more than 50 per cent of the targets focused on 
the Iraqi government machinery, communications and security 
apparatus. It was therefore suspected at the time that the 
actual objective of the strikes was to weaken and destabilize 
the Iraqi regime. However, senior United States officials 
would only admit that the strikes could have a destabilising 
effect on Saddam's command and control systems, and thus 
his control over his regime.39 
The subsequent breakdown of the Security Council's 
consensus led to the premature dissolution of UNSCOM as an 
organization. This was another nail in the coffin for the 
United Nations inspection regime in Iraq. Several 
disarmament issues remained unresolved, either because Iraq 
36 Cited in Youngs and Oakes, "'Iraq: 'Desert Fox' ... ", p. 19. 
37 Dodd, Tom and Tim Youngs, "The Iraq CriSis", House o(Commolls 
LibralY Researdl /la!JCI; 98/28, 16 February (1998). (The Unircd 
Kingdom Parliament [olllinc26 Aug lOOS]); UNSCOM: Secretary-
GmeraJ, [AEA a1ld UNSCOM letters 011 Iraqi cooperatioll, SII 998/ 
1172 of 15/1211998 IUNSCOM [nolioe 26 Aug 200511. 
38 Youngs and Oakes, "Iraq: 'Desert Fox' ... ", p. 30. 
39 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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had not (for various reasons, not all of which are known) 
provided adequate declarations or UNSCOM had been unable 
to verify Iraq's submissions. There were a number of reasons 
why UNSCOM was unable to do so, for example that Iraq 
had not submitted evidence that enabled independent 
verification of their declarations and because it was not 
technically possible to quantitatively verify some of Iraq's 
claims. One important unresolved disarmament issue 
concerned the veracity of Iraqi claims on the sum total of 
proscribed weapons they possessed in 1991 (i.e. the so-called 
baseline against which the number of verified destroyed 
proscribed weapons was measured to ascertain whether 
everything had been destroyed). 
Another unresolved issue was the quantity of proscribed 
weapons that had been unilaterally destroyed in 1991, and the 
risk that Iraq might still be retaining proscribed weapons, 
capabilities and items. UNSCOM had established in the early 
1990s that the majority of Iraqi chemical weapons, and 
especially nerve agents, were of poor quality and would not be 
effective weapons if they had been stored for years.40 For 
UNSCOM the unresolved issues were disconcerting, primarily 
because they were seen to suggest that Iraq was still not fully 
cooperating with them. This in turn cast doubts on the 
credibility of some Iraqi claims regarding their disarmament, 
as these could not be independently verified by UNSCOM or 
IAEA. After UNSCOM's dissolution, the risk of Iraq 
rebuilding the WMD weapons programmes and longer-range 
ballistic missile infrastructures became a more pressing issue 
than whether Iraq might have been able to retain fragments of 
its (pre-1991) proscribed stockpiles. It was recognized that, in 
theory, dual-use equipment could be used to develop chemical 
and biological weapon agents and proscribed ballistic missiles 
within a matter of months. 
After UNSCOM and IAEA left Iraq in late 1998, 
subsequent efforts to analyse WMD-related developments in 
Iraq were shaped by their findings and experiences over the 
40 Ekeus, "Iraq's Real Weapons Threat". 
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previous seven years. One of the lessons learned from the 
performance of intelligence before the 1991 Gulf War 
concerned the difficulties the services faced in detecting and 
analysing suspicious sites and activities, or indeed entire NBC 
programmes, without access to analyses based on extensive 
access to facilities and individuals inside Irag. 
Following the uncovering of the extensive WMD-
programmes in Irag, the demonstrated Iragi ability to develop 
WMD and ballistic missile programmes indigenously by 
following alternative routes and employing unexpected 
approaches was widely interpreted to suggest that Irag would 
be able to revive the proscribed programmes without leaving 
too many tellrale indicators that could be detected by the 
outside world. However, some specialized and technologically 
advanced items (such as guidance and control systems for 
ballistic missiles) would have to be purchased from abroad. 
Between 1991-98, UNSCOM's detection of illegal Iragi 
imports of eguipment that could be used to develop ballistic 
missiles with proscribed ranges left no illusions as to Irag's 
ability to acguire such items through the international black 
market. Without access to Iragi sites it would be almost 
impossible to detect such efforts after 1998. Given these two 
factors, it was widely suspected that the "space of 
opportunity" that emerged after United Nations inspectors 
had left Irag would be used to resume WMD programmes. It 
now appears that less weight was given to the fact that Irag's 
WMD infrastructures had been destroyed during 1991-98 and 
that Irag's scientific and technological resources suffered 
greatly from the impact of the sanctions. 
Further, the discovery of Irag's efforts to hide proscribed 
capabilities and weapons during the years of United Nations 
inspections (some of which were directed by the Iragi Special 
Security Organization) strengthened convictions that Iraq was 
very skilled in concealment practices. The Iragis appeared to 
be learning from the inspectors, and adapted their 
concealment efforts accordingly.41 This could have been taken 
41 For example through counter-intelligence. Tucker, "'Monitoring and 
verification ..... , p. 7. 
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to suggest that it would be even more difficult to detect efforts 
to resume proscribed activities in the absence of United 
Nations inspectors and monitoring. Another important lesson 
from the years of inspections came from the crucial element of 
on-site verification, i.e. following up intelligence such as 
satellite imagery on the ground with inspections of the 
capabilities and features of specific facilities. Without this 
intelligence agencies would not be able to perform the refined 
and detailed analysis necessary, or draw conclusions that 
could only be reached via extensive and unrestricted access to 
multiple sources of information on the ground in Iraq. A final 
legacy of the inspection years were the "unaccounted for" 
disarmament issues. As explained earlier, there are many 
reasons why certain disarmament issues were not fully 
accounted for. However, while the meaning of the 
"unaccounted for" category was clear in the context of 
technical numerical disarmament accounting, national 
intelligence agencies did not understand it in the same 
technical terms. The status of the weapons and items in 
question was therefore open to different interpretations and 
changing assessments in the years after Operation Desert Fox. 
Economic sanctions and domestic developments 
As a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Security Council 
Resolution 661 imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. In 1991 
these sanctions were maintained by the so-called "cease-fire" 
resolution, i.e. Security Council Resolution 687, the purpose 
of which was to secure Iraqi compliance with the various 
objectives expressed in this resolution. This was the most 
wide-ranqing regime of economic sanctions ever adopted by 
the UN.4- From the outset, the sanctions affected all Iraqi 
imports and exports, except supplies for medical purposes and 
food for what was termed "humanitarian circumstances" .43 
42 Youngs anJ Oakes, "Iraq: 'Desert Fox', .. ", p. 14. 
43 Ibid. 
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The ISG reported that Saddam Hussein initially 
underestimated both the effectiveness and comprehensiveness 
of the economic sanctions and the willingness of the 
international community to uphold them.44 It is worth noting 
that at the time, the US President George Bush (Sr) and his 
advisers also had doubts about the actual effectiveness of an 
oil embargo.45 The ISG also found that several Iragi regime 
figures, in addition to the Iraqi president, believed that the 
sanctions would only remain in place for a limited period of 
time and for no more than three years. By 1992, however, 
Saddam Hussein had grasped the comprehensiveness and 
scope of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. Over time, 
it became clear that the sanctions were having a highly 
destructive impact on Iraq's economy and military, as well as 
on its societal and governmental infrastructures. For example, 
it appears that the sanctions rapidly led to corruption, which 
had a deteriorating effect on governance.46 
In August and September 1991 the United Nations 
proposed to establish an arrangement enabling Iraq to sell oil 
under its supervision.47 However, the Iraqi regime rejected 
this proposal, arguing that it would constitute an infringement 
on Iraq's sovereignty. This refusal was consistent with the 
Iragi regime's strategy throughout 1991-98, aiming to 
undermine the Securiry Council's consensus upholding the 
economic sanctions regime by focusing on the suffering of the 
Iraqi population. 48 Between 1991 and 1995 Iraq's economy 
and national infrastructure deteriorated continuously. This 
caused considerable hardship for Iragi civilians. The Iraqi 
economy plummeted during 1995 and 1996.49 Disastrous 
44 Ducifer, Comprr/u.'lfsit'c Report ... , vo!. 1, "'Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
34. 
45 Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1991), pp. 228-19. 
46 "'Iraq backgrounder: \,'hat lies beneath", AJiddle East Re/JOTt, no. 6, 1 
October (Brus5cb: luu:rnatiunal Crisb Group, 2002), p. 10. 
47 "About the Programme", Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-food, 
(United Nations [online 21 Aug 2005]). 
48 Baram, Amatzia: "Building toward crisis: Saddam Husayn's strategy for 
survival", Policy paper, no. 47 (The Washington Institute for Near East 
policy, 1998): 71. 
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economic 20licies led to what has been described as "runaway 
inflation".>O Assessments shuw that between 1989 and 1995 
Iraqi inflation increased from 42 per cent to 387 per cent.51 
Despite Saddam Hussein's initial expectations, there were no 
signs during the next few years that the sanctions would be 
brought rapidly to an end. His domestic support appeared to 
gradually weaken in tandem with the economic decline, and 
the regime was challenged on a number of occasions. 
From the outset in 1991, Saddam Hussein sought to 
balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections - and thus 
gain support for the sanctions being lifted - with the objective 
of preserving Iraq's intellectual capital in the field of NBC 
with as little foreign intrusiveness and loss uf face as 
possible.52 By the mid-1990s the combined impact of socio-
economic, military and infrastructural damages resulting from 
the sanctions made it imperative for the Iraqi regime to ideally 
have the sanctions lifted or, at the very least, ameliorate their 
impact. According to the ISG, his primary goal from "the mid-
90s" (presumably, after Hussein Kamel's defection) until 2003 
was to get the sanctions lifted, while maintaining his regime's 
security. The ISG claimed that Iraq was prioritizing achieving 
a de facto elimination of the sanctions through illicit efforts 
and agreements rather than by fulfilling the requirements of 
Resolution 687.53 However, as regards the period from 1997 
onwards, it could be argued that the Iraqi regime's position 
must have been influenced by the United States' stated 
unwillingness to lift sanctions unless Saddam Hussein was 
removed from power as a serious obstacle to achieving this 
aim through the Security Council. Since 1991 Iraq had 
orchestrated a diplomatic campaign, spearheaded by the 
prominent Iraqi diplomat, Tariq Aziz, seeking ro achieve the 
lifting of sanctions. These efforts were strengthened once Iraq 
49 1b;d., p. 66. 
50 Ibid., p. xii. 
51 Duelfcr, Comprehellsiue Report ... , va!. 1, "Regime Finance and 
Procurement". p. 11. 
52 Duclfer, COl1lpYehe1lsil'f.' Report ... , vo!. 1, "Transmittal message", p. 9. 
53 Duelfer, Comprehensive Report ... , vol. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
35. 
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accepted the oil-far-food programme and thereafter could 
make use of economic incentives to convince others that the 
economic sanctions ought to be lifted or circumvented. 
In the aftermath of Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, the 
combination of growing economic hardship and Iraq's 
international isolation between 1991 and 1996 led to a 
number of challenges to saddam Hussein's hold on power. 54 
Instability even seemed to spread to Iraq's armed and security 
forces, as it was reported that economic hardships had led to 
a number of aborted coup attempts from the military as well 
as saddam's own Revolutionary Guard.ss This seemed to 
indicate that the regime's control over the security and 
government apparatus was perhaps not as comprehensive as 
Sad dam might have liked. Between 1991 and 1996, a number 
of tribal revolts suggested that the Iraqi regime's power bases 
might be weakening. It appears that the challenges these 
developments posed to the regime manifested themselves most 
dramatically in the Kurdish and shi'i uprisings in 1991. 
Moreover, in 1993-94 suspected coup attempts by members 
of tribes that were considered important supporters of 
saddam Hussein, coupled with a tribal revolt in 1995, 
demonstrated the decreasing loyalty of important domestic 
sources of support for the regime in previous years. 56 In 
March 1995 another Kurdish revolt illustrated that the Iraqi 
regime's control over sections of Iraqi territory was 
vulnerable. Indeed, in this instance Iraqi regular forces were in 
fact defeated by Kurdish militia.57 Then, in August 1995, the 
defection of Hussein Kamel, Sad dam's trusted son-in-law, 
demonstrated weaknesses in the loyalty within saddam 
Hussein's most highly trusted and intimate circles. This 
defection, and its aftermath, marked the culmination of 
bloody confrontations and conflicts within saddam Hussein's 
own family.58 
54 Baram, "Building Toward Crisis ... ", pp. 65-66. 
55 Baram, "Building Toward Crisis ... ", Executive summary, p. XII. 
56 Ibid., p. XI. 
57 Baram, "Building Toward Crisis ... "', p. 4l. 
58 Ibid., p. 4. 
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The Oil-for-Food programme 
In 1995 the Security Council passed Resolution 986, which 
allowed Iraq to sell oil for $1 billion every three months and 
use the income to alleviate humanitarian problems. However, 
it was not until December 1996 that Iraq finally agreed with 
the Security Council on how to implement the programme. 
The oil-for-food programme was a temporary measure that 
enabled Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil and purchase 
"humanitarian goods" \vhile the sanctions remained in 
place. 59 This arrangement would provide Iraq with a source 
of income, fund reparation payments to Kuwait and United 
Nations activities in Iraq. The ISG report concludes that 
Saddam Hussein agreed to the scheme as a result of the 
rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in Iraq.GO In March 
1997 the first shipments under the oil-for-food programme 
arrived. 
According to the ISG, former Iraqi official Tariq Aziz has 
claimed that Hussein Kamel's defection to Jordan in August 
1995 was a turning point that led to Saddam Hussein's 
acceptance of the oil-for-food programme.61 It appears that 
this event may have influenced Saddam Hussein's decision in 
a number of ways. On 1 July 1995 Iraq finally admitted to 
having an offensive biological weapons programme. This 
admission, and Kamel's subsequent defection, made it clear 
that the policy that he had recommended - i.e. not admitting 
to the existence of the biological or nuclear weapons 
programmes - had failed once and for all. Abandoning the 
disastrous policy of partial declaration, rhat Hussein Kamel 
appears to have conceived and orchestrated, essentially 
required a new approach to Iraq's relations with weapons 
inspection agencies and the Security Council. After Iraq 
admitted it had a biological weapons programme it must have 
been clear to the regime that it was unlikely that sanctions 
would be lifted for quite some time. Some form of 
59 "About the Programmt''', Office for Iraq Programme ... 
60 Dueifer, Comprehensil'c Report ...• voJ. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
48. 
61 Ibid. 
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arrangement was required to ameliorate the economic 
conditions - especially given the poor condition of the Iraqi 
economy. Hussein Kame!'s return to Iraq, and his subsequent 
murder, boosted Sad dam Hussein's domestic standing, and the 
oil-for-food programme could therefore be accepted without 
causing fatal blows to his political prestige.62 The ISG also 
pointed to a third factor that encouraged Iraq to finally accept 
the programme, namely France, Russia and China's efforts to 
persuade Iraq to do so.63 
After the oil-for-food programme came into operation the 
Iraqi regime came to the conclusion that this could constitute 
a turning point. The programme offered an opportunity to 
ameliorate Iraq's economic condition and enable Iraq to draw 
on a very effective means of exerting influence, namely by 
appealing to the economic interests of others. Under the oil-
for-food arrangement, Iraq was in charge of the contracting 
process for oil sales and "humanitarian goods" purchases. The 
majority of Iraqi oil contracts were thus allocated to firms 
based in countries sympathetic to Iraq - although from late 
2000 and onwards they had to pay Iraqis an illegal 
"surcharge" under the table. Moreover, Iraq offered large 
construction projects that would be implemented once 
sanctions were lifted to foreign firms - and thus made use of 
another powerful economic incentive that could shape the 
opinions of decision-makers in those countries.64 According to 
ISG's final report, Iraq sought to influence the political 
position of a number of countries regarding the UN sanctions 
regime throu~h oil vouchers and beneficial trade 
agreements.6- It has also been alleged that the Iraqi regime 
gave oil vouchers to a number of politicians in various 
countries, as well as journalists and officials in the oil-for-food 
programme, to acquire and maintain infl uence and allies. 
62 Baram, "Building toward crisis ... ", p. 66. 
63 Duclfer, COlllprehcltsil'c Report ... , vol. 1, "Regime Finance and 
Ilrocurcmcnt", p. 48; Baram, "Building toward crisis ... ", p. 70-71. 
64 Duclfcr, COl1lpreiJellsil'c Report ... , VDU, "Regime Strategic Intent'" p. 
39. 
65 Duelfcr, C0111fJrehel1Sil!f~ Report ... , vo!. 1, "Regime Finance and 
Procurement", p. 111; p. 11; p. 28. 
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In 2000, Iraq's (technically illegal) trade protocol with 
Jordan was followed by similar illegal arrangements with 
Syria and Turkey. Iraq's establishment of trade protocols with 
neighbouring countries was not challenged, which 
demonstrated that at this point the sanctions regime could (to 
a considerable extent) be more easily circumvented than had 
previously been the case. Under these protocols, Iraq could 
obtain money or items that were prohihited under the oil-for-
food programme.66 These arrangements provided the means 
that enabled the subsequent improvement of Iraq's economy. 
With the passing of Security Council Resolution 1266 in 
October 1999, the amount of Iraqi oil exports was increased. 
Resolution 1284 then finally removed the limit previously 
placed on the amount of revenue Iraq could obtain through its 
oil sales.67 Though Iraq was unable to bring about the lifting 
of the economic sanctions between 1998 and 2002, during 
those years its legal and illegal revenue increased considerably. 
This income was used to fund illegal purchases of 
conventional weapons, dual-use equipment (that could 
potentially be used for proscribed activities) and to support 
Iraq's ballistic missiles programmes.6B After 1998, the Iraqi 
regime hoped that the economic sanctions would be 
undermined to the extent that they would ultimately 
collapse.69 
From 1996 and onwards, the tide began to turn for 
Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime within Iraq as well 
as on the international arena. After years of unrest, that 
threatened to weaken Saddam Hussein's regime and its hold 
On power, his successful military intervention in an armed 
conflict between Kurdish groups in August 1996 constituted a 
66 Duelfcr, Comprehellsil'e Report ... , voJ. 1, "Regime Finance and 
J)rocurcmenr", p. 11. 
67 Dudfcr, Comprebensiut! Report ... , vol. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
59. 
68 Duelfcr, ComprehcmilJc Report ... , vol. 1, "'Regime Finance and 
]lrocurcmcnt", p.ll. 
69 Duelfer, Comprehensil'c Report .. " \lol. I, "Transmittal message", p. 10. 
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first step towards strengthening his domestic standing. 
Subsequently, the domestic standing of the regime began to 
improve considerably?O 
The sanctions regime was increasingly criticized by 
members of the Security Council and a number of countries in 
terms of the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian conditions of 
the Iraqi population. The oil-far-food programme offered the 
Security Council an important opportunity to deflect some of 
the critique raised against the sanctions regime and point to 
the Iraqi regime's responsibility in managing the income from 
oil sales. For example, while the economic sanctions were the 
most wide-ranging economic sanctions ever imposed by the 
United Nations, the oil-for-food programme has been 
described as the largest country-specific humanitarian aid 
programme ever undertaken by the organization.71 
The Iraqi government and the United Nations shared the 
administration of the oil-far-food programme. Iraqi 
authorities administrated the programme in central and 
southern Iraq, while the United Nations (i.e. the Office of the 
Iraq programme) undertook this task in northern Iraq.72 For 
purchases of all items that did not fall into the food, (certain) 
medical and agricultural categories, Iraq submitted 
procurement proposals to the Iraq Sanctions Committee. This 
committee was comprised of representatives from 15 
countries, who reviewed Iraq's proposals with the aim of 
ensuring that Iraq did not acquire items that could be used for 
proscribed purposes?3 However, as it turned out this 
monitoring mechanism was not particularly effective. Few of 
the member countries on the Committee enjoyed access and 
resources that enabled proper investigation of the proposals. 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, some countries have been 
70 Baram, "Building toward crisis ... ", Executive summary p. xiii. 
71 "The Sanctions Committee on Iraq" (Permanent Mission of Germany to 
the United Nations [ouline 21 Aug 2005]). 
72 United Nations, Office for Iraq Programme, About the Programme, 
[aoline 21 Aug 2005]. 
73 "Fact Sheet: 'Goods Rcvic\v List' for Iraq", USUN Press Release, no. 68 
(02),14 r."lay 2002 (United Srates mission to the United Nations [onlinc 
26 Augli. 
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accused of "selective attention" while others appear to have 
conducted illicit trade with Iraq while they were members of 
this committee. 
After the invasion in 2003 it emerged that the oil-for-food 
programme was vulnerable to manipulation by the Iraqi 
regime in a number of ways. These weaknesses, and their 
abuse by the Iraqi regime and other countries, served to 
illegally enrich the Iraqi regime and undermined the consensus 
that underpinned the sanctions and inspection regimes. It has 
emerged that the Iraqi regime clandestinely obtained funds 
through surcharges - i.e. money paid under the table to the 
Iraqi regime by those purchasing oil through the oil-for-food 
framework. Another source of illicit income was so-called 
"kickbacks" on UN-approved contracts for goods purchased 
under the oil-for-food programme - i.e. that Iraq paid an 
inflated amount of money for the purchased goods and that 
the surplus amount (approx. 10 per cent of the price) was 
subsequently returned by the customerJ4 
While the scope of Iraqi efforts and their gains from these 
activities were not known until the release of the ISG's report 
in October 2004, the fact that Iraqis undertook smuggling and 
traded outside the oil-for-food framework did not come as a 
surprise. Over the years numerous indications that smuggling 
and illegal trade practices were taking place in Iraq had 
emerged. For example, in 1999 the Economist Intelligence 
Unit estimated that Iraq had earned roughly $1.5 billion from 
smuggling and other illicit activitiesJ5 Furthermore, a number 
of internal United Nations audits had been conducted. These 
audits detected a number of managerial weaknesses such as 
inadequate contractor supervision and failure to follow up 
recommendations from previous auditsJ6 However, it appears 
74 Dudfcr, Comprehcllsil'c Report ... , vol. "1, "Regime Finance and 
Procurement''', p. 35. 
75 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report 41h Quarter 1999 -Iraq, p. 
7, cited in Amatzia Baram, "The effect of Iraqi Sanctions: Statistical 
pitfalls and responsibility", The Middle East Journal, "01. 54, no. 2, 
(spring 2000): 194-223. 
76 New York Times, editorial: "The oil·for-food audits", 17 January 2005. 
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that they did not reveal the scope of Iraq's efforts, or its 
system of bribes and kickbacks that were uncovered in 2004-
05. 
Based on Iraqi documentation, the ISG estimated that Iraq 
earned $7.5 billion on bilateral economic trade agreements, $2 
billion from "kickbacks" from the oil-for-food framework, 
$990 million from oil "cash sales" or smuggling and $230 
million from other surcharges.77 Iraq's clandestine income 
was used to import illegal military hardware and dual-use 
technologies'?s This illustrates how the pressurized regime 
sought to cope with the security implications that resulted 
from the sanctions and limitations imposed on Iraq in 1991. 
Saddam Hussein considered the sanctions a threat to Iraq's 
national security, partly because of its role in ending the 
WMD programmes and the detrimental impacts sanctions had 
on Iraqi military and security forces,?9 It was, therefore, 
perhaps not surprising that funds obtained through illicit trade 
activities were used to purchase military equipment, including 
imports used to develop ballistic missile technologies. Iraq's 
illegal military acquisition can be seen as having undermined 
the aim of containment that underpinned the United Nations' 
efforts in Iraq. However, although the sanction regime was 
somewhat undermined by these illegal activities it appears to 
have remained a crucial factor in preventing Iraq from 
reconstituting the NBC programmes in the absence of United 
Nations inspectors. 
As the crisis with Iraq mounted in 1998, efforts were made 
to draw on incentives from the sanctions regime to resolve the 
deadlock, despite disagreements over the issue of sanctions in 
the Security Council. On 9 September 1998 Security Council 
Resolution 1194 determined that the bimonthly sanctions 
review would cease until Iraq had readmitted weapons 
77 Duelfcr, ComfJrehellsipc Report ... , vol. 1, "'Regime Finance and 
procun::lllcnt", p. 4. 
78 Ducifcr, CompreiJel1sit'c Report ... , vol. 1, "Transmittal message", p. 11. 
79 Rand Alkadiri, "Iraq and rhe Gulf since 1991: The search for 
deliverance"', chapter 12 in Gary Sick and Lawrence G. Potter, Security 
ill the Persiall Gulf: origins, obstacles and the search for consel1sus (I\cw 
York: Pa!gravc, 2002 ), p. 256. 
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inspectors and let them undertake their work without 
obstruction. In early December, after the UN weapons 
inspectors' recent return to Irag, the Security Council was 
willing to offer Irag what was described as a "comprehensive 
review" of the sanctions regime. Irag was positive initially, 
hoping that a review would focus on an "end point" and 
provide an opportunity to end the oil embargo. However, 
when it became clear that the United States would not 
consider lifting the sanctions as part of this review process, the 
Iraqi enthusiasm dropped. SO 
After Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, the 
widening gap between the United States and Britain on one 
hand, and Russia, France and China on the other, also 
reflected on the issue of what to do about the sanctions after 
the weapons inspectors had left Iraq. Berween 1999 and 2001, 
the United States and Britain faced numerous criticisms 
against the sanctions regime and its humanitarian impact. This 
led to a foclls on what was termed "smart sanctions" - a more 
targeted sanctions regime that could alleviate some of the 
problems while shifting the blame for the humanitarian crisis 
onto Saddam Hussein and his policies. In Resolution 1352, 
passed in June 2001, the Security Council stated that it would 
consider new arrangements for imrorrs to Irag in order to 
improve the flow of commodities. 1 
Almost a year later, new arrangements to this effect were 
implemented when Security Council Resolution 1409 was 
passed on 14 May 2002. This resolution led to changes in the 
approval of contracts that meant that far fewer contracts 
would have to be approved by the Sanctions Committee. A 
new system was established, where goods would fall into one 
of three categories. All contracts concerning arms, munitions 
and WMD-related materials and items would be automatically 
refused. Any imports of "dual-use" items, all of which would 
80 Edirh Iv1. lcdercr, "US Say~ Ir;~q Sanctions Will Remain", Associated 
Press, Tuesday, 17 November] 998; Barbara Crossene, "U.S. seems 
ready to accept a D.N. review of Iraqi sanctions", New York Times, 7 
December 1998. 
81 Security Council Resolution 1352 (2001). (The United Nations 
Compensation Commission [online 26 Aug 2005]). 
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be defined on the Goods Review List (GRL) established for 
this purpose, would be forwarded to the Sanctions Committee 
for acceptance or refusal. The GRL was designed as a means 
to identify items that could have both civilian and clandestine 
applications, where the proposed purchase needed further 
examination before approval could be granted. Finally, if a 
contract neither contained any prohibited irems nor an~ items 
listed on the GRL it would be automatically approved. 2 This 
system waS ro be operated by the Office of the Iraq 
Programme, UNMOVIC and IAEA, which would examine 
contracts and categorize each into one of the three categories. 
It was argued that this would lead to a faster set of procedures 
for Iraqi purchases of civilian goods. Under previous 
arran~,ements, contracts could be held up for long periods of 
time. So However, It could be argued that the reduced role of 
the Sanctions Committee had the less desirable effect of 
providing a less transparent overview of Iraqi trade. 
In June 2002, the scope of the oil-for-food programme was 
enlarged beyond food and medicine to include allocations of 
funding for the rehabilitation of infrastructure. In June 2002, 
the Iraqi regime introduced another ten areas to be covered by 
the "humanitarian sector" in the oil-for-food programme. 
This scheme was known as "oil for food plus". The additional 
areas included construction, industry, labour and social 
affairs, the Board of Youth and Sports, information, culture, 
religious affairs, justice, finance, and the Central Bank of Iraq. 
This of course meant that there were a lot more contracts to 
be processed and checked. 
After the war started in March 2003, Security Council 
Resolution 1472 was passed. This authorized UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan to facilitate delivery of goods contracted 
by the Government of Iraq for humanitarian purposes. 
Civilian sanctions on Iraq were lifted on 22 May by Security 
Council Resolution 1483, which also opened for Iraqi oil 
export and the termination of the oil-for-food programme 
81 Cambridge Solidarity with Iraq, Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq 
(onlinc 26 Aug 2005]. 
83 '"'Fact Sheet ... ", USUN Press Release. 
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within the next six months. The Office of the Iraq programme 
continued to import humanitarian guods until it closed on 21 
November 2003. 
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Chapter 3 
US Iraq Policy and the UN: 
Disarmament or Regime Change 
From the Gulf War to 1998 
During and after the first Iraq war of 1991 many voices, both 
inside and outside the US administration, maintained that the 
coalition forces should have pushed on to Baghdad and 
finished the regime of Saddam Hussein. But President George 
H. Bush, his Secretary of State James Baker III, his Defence 
Secretary Richard Cheney, among others, firmly rejected that 
idea, for several reasons: The UN mandate for war referred 
only to the liberation of Kuwait, and any attempt to transgress 
that mandate would break up the coalition. Also, as Cheney 
said in a later interview: "The assumption from the experts 
was that Saddam would never survive the defeat." There were 
also serious concerns abour the likely results of a regime 
change forced on Iraq by foreign military power, in the form 
of serious internal unrest, and possibly a split of the country 
as the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south might 
revolt and demand independence. Cheney, in the interview 
just referred ra, said that "the idea of going into Baghdad for 
example or trying to topple the regime wasn't anything I was 
enthusiastic about. I felt there was a real danger here that you 
would get bogged down in a long drawn our conflict, that this 
was a dangerous difficult part of the world, if you recall we 
were all worried abour the possibility of Iraq coming 
aparL .. ,,84 Those concerns seemed amply confirmed by the 
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uprisings in both north and south Iraq immediately following 
the end of the war. The uprisings were brutally put down by 
the central government, and the coalition did not intervene in 
support of the insurgents. 
The official policy of the United States toward Iraq after 
1991, and the policy unanimously adopted and supported by 
the United Nations, was therefore one of containment. A 
sanctions regime, instituted by the UN under the cease-fire 
resolution SC 687, and enforced through an intrusive system 
of inspections by a United Nations Special Commission -
UNSCOM, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), was intended to ensure that Iraq would not again be 
in a position tu muunt aggressive actions against its 
neighbours. In the preamble to resolution 687 the Security 
Council spoke of the overriding "need to be assured of Iraq's 
peaceful intentions". But in the operative part - Section C, 
paragraph 8 - the Council decided 
that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, 
removal, or rendering harmless, under international 
supervision, of: 
(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks 
of agents and all related subsystems and components 
and all research, development, support and 
manufacturing facilities; 
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production 
facilities. 
Further, the Council in paragraph 12 
Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to 
acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-
weapons-usable material or any subsystems or 
components or any research, development, support or 
manufacturing facilities related to the above .,. 
84 Richard Chene}, in an inrerview for Public Broadcasting System /online 
16 Aug 20051. in the series Oral History/Tbc decisio1l makers, January 
1996. 
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Later in 1991 the inspections were reinforced through the 
establishment, by the US, the UK and France, of a no-fly zone 
in the north above the 36th parallel, complemented in the 
following year hy a no-fly zone in the south below the 32nd 
parallel. 
But would the combination of inspections and sanctions 
work? Could the Iraqi regime really be persuaded to disarm to 
an irreversible extent? Few thought that was possible. Bur 
there was still hope that an intrusive inspections regime, 
combined with a fairly high level of Iraqi cooperation 
obtained through a gradual easing of sanctions, might suffice 
to dissuade the regime from rebuilding their WMD 
capabilities. The question was whetber that would be enough 
to assure the hardliners in tbe Security Council of "Iraq's 
peaceful intentions". Saddam Hussein's record of developing 
and using weapons of mass destruction both before and 
during the Gulf War, and the various ways in which the 
regime sought to obstruct the work of the UN weapons 
inspectors, meant that a cloud of uncertainty hung over the 
containment policy right from the beginning. Many thought 
that Iraq would remain a threat for as long as Saddam 
Hussein remained in power. For a time there was hope that an 
internal opposition, aided and abetted by Iraqi exile groups, 
would rise against Saddam. But the possibility of any such 
revolt being successful seemed to vanish after Saddam crushed 
a coup attempt by senior Iraqi officers in 1996.85 In the 
meantime public opinion in Western Europe had begun to 
criticise the sanctions as causing sufferings and deprivations 
for the civilian population of Iraq. In the United Nations 
Security Council the Americans and the British were becoming 
increasingly isolated. France withdrew from the enforcement 
of the no-fly zone in 1996. Then, in December 1998, the 
British and the Americans launched operation Desert Fox, a 
brief but intense campaign of air strikes intended to convince 
the Iraqi regime that they were prepared to use force if the 
85 Lawrence Freedman, "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat"', SUrlJit'al, vo!. 
46, no. 2 (2004): 11. 
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obstruction of UNSCOM's efforts did not stop, But Saddam's 
response was to ban the inspectors from Iraqi territory. 
Clearly, the policy of containment was in serious trouble. 
Containment had been America's, and the Western 
alliance's, generally successful strategy towards the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War, and 
the emergence of a much more diffuse spectre of threats and 
challenges to the western world, seemed to call for a 
reappraisal of that strategy. The first seeds of America's search 
for a new national strategy alternative to containment can be 
found in a Pentagon position paper from the winter of 1992 
authored by Paul D. Wolfowitz, Under-Secretary of Delense 
for Policy, with the assistance of Secretary of Defense 
Cheney's chief aide 1. Lewis Libby. That internal policy paper, 
intended to start the process of drafting a new Defense 
Planning Guidance, was apparently endorsed by Cheney. But 
when the draft, or excerpts thereof, was leaked to the New 
York Times in March 1992, the somewhat aggressive tenor of 
some of the proposals caused it to be withdrawn.86 
The paper had as its point of departute the indisputable 
fact that the United States was now the only superpower. 
From this the authors proceeded to declare that the number 
one objective of US post-Cold War political and military 
strategy should be to prevent the emergence of a rival 
superpower. Another major objective should be to safeguard 
US interests, and promote American values such as respect for 
international law, limit international violence, encourage the 
spread of democratic forms of government and open economic 
systems. Those objectives were hardly controversial, and well 
within the mainstream of US foreign and security policy. The 
means recommended for the attainment of such ends were 
rather more controversial. In outlining some scenarios for 
possible regional conflicts that the US might have to deal with, 
particularly Iraq and North Korea, the paper made a strong 
pitch for unilateral action. Collective action by coalitions 
86 Dilip Hiro, Secrets and Lies (New York, N.Y: Nation Books, 2(04), pp. 
7-8. 
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might be useful on an ad hoc basis, but "the United States 
should be postured tu act independently when collective 
action cannot be orchestrated". 87 
As the administration of which Cheney and Wolfowitz 
were members was defeated in the 1992 election, nothing 
more was heard about the paper or any revisions thereof. 
Wolfowitz himself returned to academic life. But in 1997 he 
was one of the founders of a group of so-called neo-
conservatives which called itself the Project for the New 
American Century (PNAC). The aim of the project was "to 
explain what American world leadership entails" and "to rally 
support for a vigorous and principled policy of American 
international involvement". And on the eve of the annual 
State of the Union address in January 1998, Wolfowitz and 
several other neo-conservatives published an open letter to 
President Bill Clinron. There they stated, among other things, 
that containmenr of Saddam Hussein had failed, and therefore 
his removal from power needed to become the aim of 
American foreign policy. 
Regime change in Iraq was nor a novel idea for the Clinton 
administration. While they actively pursued a policy of 
containment, and worked within the UN system to sustain the 
combination of inspections and sanctions, Washington kept 
hoping for, and surreptitiously aiding and abetting, a regime 
change from within Iraq. In March 1997 Madeleine Albright, 
Clinton's Secretary of State, gave a speech at Georgetown 
University in Washington D.e. where she outlined the policy 
to be pursued towards Iraq. Starring from the premise that the 
policy of containment and sanctions had been successful, she 
also warned against those who argued that sanctions should 
be lifted if Iraq complied with its obligations concerning 
weapons of mass destruction. "Our view, which is 
unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It 
can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council 
Resolutions to which it is subject." She then asked, 
rhetorically: "Is it possible to conceive of such a government 
87 "Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prc\'cnt the Rc-Emergence of a New 
RivaJ'" Ne/{' York Times, 8 March 1992. 
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under Saddam Hussein?" and her answer was that "the 
evidence is overwhelmin§l that Saddam Hussein's intentions 
will never be peaceful.,,8 She then went on to speak about the 
prospects for US relations with a successor regime in Iraq. 
The Albright speech hit UNSCOM like a bombshell. Not 
because the idea of regime change could be new to them. In 
their minds, as they struggled to perform their inspection 
duties against regime obstructionism, they must have had 
many moments when they thought that they were on a 
"mission impossible", and that only a different regime in Iraq 
would enable them to fulfil their task. But they could of 
course never say so, because that would be tantamount to 
telling Saddam Hussein that full cooperation with UNSCOM 
was no guarantee that sanctions would be lifted. With 
Madeleine Albright's statement, the cat was out of the bag. 
From that moment the conflict between the UN and Iraq 
would proceed along two different tracks. On the overt track 
of declared UN policy, the issue was Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction. Once they were removed, Saddam would get his 
reward: the lifting of sanctions. But below the surface lurked 
the growing conviction of the United States, in particular, that 
removing Saddam Hussein's regime was the only way to 
remove Iraq as a threat. With Madeleine Albright's speech, the 
Clinton administration was on record as favouring regime 
change. In practice, however, it shied away from forceful 
implementation of that position. Sensitive to the charge that 
the US administration had "gone soft" on Saddam, President 
Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, passed by the Senate in 
October 1998, which authorised financial and military 
assistance to the Iraqi opposition to the value of USD 79 
million.89 But that, plus the intermittent air strikes, was as far 
as he was prepared to go. 
88 Mndelcinc Albright, "Discours du Secrerairc d'Etar tvladelcinc Albright, 
Gcorgctown, 26 March '1997" (English text), Ca/JiCf L'Empire contre 
l'lrak (Le MOl/de Diplomatique [onlinc 16 Aug 2005]). 
89 Strategic SUrt·cy 199819, International Institute of Strategic Studies 
(Oxford, lISS, 1999), p.173. 
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Then, in order to demonstrate the seriollsness of demands 
for Iraqi disarmament, the United States and Great Britain on 
16 December 1998 began Operation Desert Fox, a massive 
series of air strikes against targets suspected of being involved 
in Iraqi WMD activities. It is worth noting that a few weeks 
earlier the British representative on the Security Council had 
warned that "the authorisation to use force given by the 
Security Council in 1990 may be revived if the Council decides 
that there has been a sufficientlv serious breach of the 
conditions laid down by the Co~ncil for the ceasefire" .90 The 
other members of the Council except the United States, 
however, made it clear that any unilateral action was 
unjustified. Among the Council members RU>sia now strongly 
condemned the bombing, whereas the other western members 
registered only mild reservations. France "deplored the 
situation that had led to the air strike and the consequences 
for the Iraqi people", and the Swedish representative said that 
he would have supported military action if all diplomatic 
means to solve the crisis had been exhausted.91 
Saddam Hussein's action at the end of 1998, of formally 
expelling the UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq, was announced 
as retaliation against the Desert Fox bombing campaign. But it 
is difficult to avoid seeing it also as a consequence of 
Baghdad's realisation that cooperation with the inspections 
carried no guarantee that the sanctions regime would ever 
end. According to the Iraq Survey Group's report, "Saddam, 
Tariq 'Aziz, and other senior regime officials realized hy 
August 1998 that Iraq would not be able to satisfy UNSCOM 
and the United Nations Security Council and have sanctions 
lifted.,,92 Instead, Saddam Hus~ein had good reason for 
90 Statement issued by the UK IJermancnr Mission to the UN 5 November 
1998. The resolution referred to was Resolution 678 of 1990 which was 
the basis for the 1991 Gulf War. Interestingly, Norway's Foreign 
IvIinistcr Knut Vollebxk, in n ~tatcment to parliament on 23 February 
1998, said that the authorisation for the usc of military meanS against 
Iraq in Resolution 678 applied also in relation to all relevant latcr 
resolutions. 
91 Unitcd Nations Security Council: Press release 5C16611, 16 December 
1998 (United Nations- [online 6 Sep 2005J). 
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thinking that time was on his side: His propaganda campaign 
against the sanctions, with television footage of suffering Iraqi 
children in hospitals without medicine and proper care, was 
working. The earlier consensus in the UN Security Council 
about the maintenance of sanctions was breaking up, with 
France and Russia leading efforts towards a relaxation in 
order to alleviate the plight of the civilian population. In the 
meantime the "Oil-Far-Food" programme, initiated in ]996 
to let Iraq export a limited amount of oil and use the proceeds 
to pay for food imports, was providing Saddam with funds 
that were used to undermine sanctions and subvert import 
restrIctIOns. 
After UNSCOM (1998-2001) 
UNSCOM's departure from Iraq in 1998 became something 
of a turning point in two respects. Firstly, it brought the 
debate in the Security Council back to the question of how to 
pursue the containment of Iraq now that the main instrument, 
the inspections regime, had been lost. 
By this time the Security Council consensus round the 
disarmament inspections regime had become severely strained, 
as the seven permanent members showed tendencies to split 
into two fractions. Russia, France and China had for some 
time been searching for ways to overcome the seemingly 
endless disputes over what Iraq had or had not done with its 
\'VMD, or over access for the UN inspectors to suspected sites. 
One suggestion gaining ground was that the United Nations 
disarmament regime ought to move to monitoring ongoing 
Iraqi activities with a bearing on proscribed weapons, rather 
than continuing the investigation of remaining unsolved 
disarmament issues. In fact, while paying lip service to the 
need to disarm Iraq, Russia and China would like the issue to 
go away. France tried to maintain a vaguely intermediate 
position, formally insisting on full disarmament while at the 
same time urging a relaxation of the sanctions regime. The 
92 Duclfcr, Comprehensive Re/JOr! ... , \'01. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent"', p. 
55. 
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need for a new departure was not least due to the growing 
opposition to economic saIH.:tions among the population in a 
number of western countries, due to their impact on the Iraqi 
civilian population. However, the United States and Britain, 
while accepting the need to offer "carrots" to Iraq such as the 
"oil-for-food" programme, still maintained that the pressure 
on Iraq should continue until UN inspectors had fully verified 
Iraq's complete WMD disarmament, as required by Security 
Council Resolution 687. 
In February 1999, as part of an attempt to re-esrablish a 
consensus in the Security Council, two panels were then set 
up, one to study the issues relating to Iraq's WMD 
developments, the other one to review tht: humanitarian 
situation in the country. A Brazilian diplomat, Celso Amorim, 
was appointed to chair both panels (and a third one focusing 
on the Kuwait issue). The Amorim report on the situation as 
regards Iraq's WMD was dated 27 March 1999. Its central 
feature was a proposal to replace UNSCOM with a reinforced 
version of something foreshadowed in previous Security 
Council resolutions, namely an "ongoing monitoring and 
verification" regime that would be both comprehensive and 
intrusive. 
On 17 December 1999, almost exactly a year after 
Operation Desert Fox, a Security Council resolution -
Resolution 1284 - was passed with abstentions from Russia, 
China, France and Malaysia. This resolution established the 
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC) as UNSCOM's successor 
organisation. Resolution 1284 specified UNMOVIC's 
mandate in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Amorim reports, i.e. reinforced monitoring and verification to 
ascertain that Iraq was not rebuilding proscribed capabilities. 
In regard to remaining disarmament tasks the resolution 
required that UNMOVIC and the IAEA should draw up a 
work programme in which key remaining disarmament tasks 
Were to be identified. This suggests that under Resolution 
1284, the UN inspection agencies would have more discretion 
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in designing the disarmament verification process than had 
been the case with UNSCOM and lAtA between 1991 and 
1998.93 
In addition to bringing out into the open the divisions in 
the Security Council regarding the sanctions regime, a second 
major consequence of the departure of UNSCOM, and 
perhaps the most crucial one, was to deprive the western 
powers of an essential source of intelligence on Iraqi WMD. 
Subsequent inquiries are unanimous in stressing the 
importance of UNSCOM as a vital source of intelligence. The 
U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that: 
The Intelligence Community relied too heavily on 
United Nations (UN) ( ... ) information about Iraq's 
programs and did not develop a sufficient unilateral 
collection effort targeting Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction programs and related activides to 
supplement UN-collected information and to take its 
place upon the departure of the UN inspectors.94 
Similarly, the UK's Butler Committee stated: 
Between 1991 and 1998, the bulk of information used 
in assessing the status of Iraq's biological, chemical and 
ballistic missile programmes was derived from 
UNSCOM reports. ( ... ) after the departure of United 
Nations inspectors in December 1998, information 
sources were sparse, particularly on Iraq's chemical and 
biological weapons programmes.95 
Without the considerable number of UN inspectors on the 
ground in Iraq, the United States and the United Kingdom had 
to fall back on their own limited intelligence resources in Iraq. 
Their wealth of technical intelligence facilities, in the form of 
93 Resolution 1284 and its consequences: will be reviewed in greater detail 
in Chapter 5. 
94 Re/JUT! un Ihe V.S. 11ltdligellcI! Omlflllmily'5 Prewar I11telligellce 
Assessments ... , p. 160. 
95 Ret'iew of Intelligencc 011 Wlea[JOlls of Mass DC5tTllctioll. Report of il 
Committee of Priu)' Councillors, The Butler Committee (London: The 
Stationery Office, July 10(4), p. 107. Frequently referred to as the Buder 
report. 
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imagery, electronic and communications satellites, had serious 
shortcomings. As one expert has noted, "Their fundamental 
limitation lies in the fact that adversaries know too much 
about their operating parameters - in particular, precisely 
when they are overhead and what they are capable of 
collecting. This makes gathering information from satellites 
( ... ) highly susceptible to relatively simple concealment and 
deceprion measures. The fact that Iraq practiced such 
concealment and deception techniques was well known in 
advance of the withdrawal of the UNSCOM inspectors after 
Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. ,,96 Also, imagery 
could not look inside buildings, and communications that 
went by secure lines required someone on the ground who 
could physically tap the fibre-optic cables. Human intelligence 
(HUMINT) was what was needed, and that was the main 
problem. Of human intelligence agents on the ground in Iraq 
the United Kingdom apparently had only four or five,97 some 
of whose reports have later been withdrawn as unreliable. As 
for the United States, the Senate Intelligence Committee found 
that "The CIA ( ... ) did not have any WMD sources in Iraq 
after 1998.,,98 
For the period after 1998, therefore, the U.S. Senate 
Intelligence Committee concluded: "The Intelligence 
Community depended too heavily on defectors and foreign 
government services to obtain human intelligence (HUMINT) 
information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. 
Because the Intelligence Community did not have direct access 
to many of these sources, it was extremely difficult to 
determine source credihility.,,99 The shortage of reliable or 
verifiable intelligence appears to have had two consequences. 
Firstly, lack of intelligence bred uncertainty, which tends to he 
conducive to worst-case scenarios. This was a familiar story 
96 Dennis M. Gormley, "'The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq's Lessons'" 
SlIrJ1itmi, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 10-11. 
97 Rel';cfI' o{IlIfelligellcc Oil \V/capons of Mass Destmctioll ... , esp. pp. 
100-109. 
98 Re/Jort 011 the U.S. I1ltelligence COII/IIUII/il}"S Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments ... , , p. 260. 
99 Ibid., p. 269. 
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from the early Cold War, when ignorance about Soviet 
capabilities had led to alarms such as the "Bomber Gap" and 
the "Missile Gap". The history of Saddam's deception and 
surreptitious attempts to retain certain WMD capabilities, and 
the absence of reassurances based on inspectors' observacions, 
gave freer rein to those, including many in the world of 
intelligence, who were convinced that Iraq would use the 
absence of inspectors to continue or even accelerate proscribed 
weapons programmes. 
The language of the British Joint Intelligence Committee's 
assessment of April 2000 is in this respect revealing. In 
relation to chemical and biological weapons they admitted 
that the "picture is limited. But it is likely that Iraq is 
continuing to develop its offensive chemical warfare (CW) and 
biological warfare (BW) capabilities." 1 DO They were rather 
more certain about biological than about chemical warfare 
activity, and referred for the first time to the mobile 
production facilities that were later to figure in Secretary of 
State Colin Powell's dramatic statement to the Security 
Council in February 2003. But the Butler report has since 
revealed that the assessment was partly based on information 
from 1997-1998, and that the information about mobile 
factories, coming from a liaison service, later turned out to be 
"incorrect" .101 The Senate Intelligence Committee found that 
the information about biological weapons came from a single 
source, codenamed CurvebaIJ, whom the Defense Intelligence 
Agency subsequently described as an alcoholic, and singularly 
lacking in scientific expertise.102 
Another effect of the lack of intelligence from verifiable 
sources was to open the door for Iraqi exile groups, who had 
their own self-serving agenda for working towards regime 
change in Iraq. And as Washington was particularly deficient 
in reliable agents on the ground in Iraq, the US administration 
100 Rc/.'icu/ of Imelligcnce on \X/capons of Mass Destmctioll ... , p. 59, icalics 
added. 
10] Ibid., p. 59 and footnote 2. Curvcball was apparently run by the 
German intelligence service. 
102 Report 011 the V.S. Intelligence C0ll11111t1litys Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments ... , pp. 151-6. 
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not unnaturally was especially receptive to exiles and defectors 
who claimed to have insiJe information. While those groups 
had limited intelligence to provide about weapons of mass 
destruction, they also provided political intelligence that 
inevitably served their own political purposes. It is at that 
juncture that the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmed 
Chalabi, began to make its mark on Washington. A seminal 
event seems to have been a speech that Chalabi gave to the 
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in June 1997. 
There he held out the promise that Saddam could be 
overthrown on the cheap if the United States would back a 
guerrilla force led by Chalabi. Neo-conservatives like 
Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith were drawn to 
Chalabi and his movement, and together they had lobbied 
Congress to pass the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act. But the neo-
conservatives were not alone in entertaining hopes that 
Saddam might be toppled without overt US intervention: The 
Iraq Liberation Act was passed with overwhelming support of 
both Republicans and Democrats. "It was seen as an easy 
vote, giving the appearance of taking a stand against Sad dam 
without actually having to do much.,,]03 
The George W. Bush Administration takes over 
With an exceedingly feeble popular mandate, having been 
more or less "appointed" to the Presidency by the US Supreme 
Court after the tragi-comic spectacle of the election process in 
Florida, many expected George W. Bush to adopt a low 
profile as he assumed office, humbly calling for national unity 
and appealing for cooperation across party lines. Also, being 
aware of the new President's marked lack of international 
experience, most observers thought foreign policy would be 
low on his agenda. His Vice-President, Richard Cheney, hoped 
otherwise. But during the national security briefings given to 
the President before taking office, Bush displayed no active 
interest. Iraq, in particular, was not on the agenda for action 
during the first weeks of the Bush administration, although 
103 Scc "The Rise and Fall of Chalabi". Ncwsweek, 31 May 2004. 
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the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was - second 
in priority only to Osama bin Laden and his AI Qaida terrorist 
network. 
A general review of US policy towards Iraq was the topic 
for a 17 February 2001 meeting of the "principals" - the top 
national security policymakers: the President's national 
security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Vice President Richard 
Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, and Director of Central Intelligence George 
Tenet, who on this occasion was represented by his deputy 
John McLaughlin. The consensus of the meeting was that the 
sanctions policy was in disarray and ought to be revised and 
tightened, and that the lack of inspectors on the ground was a 
serious concern. But no clear plan of action was proposed. 104 
On 1 March the principals met again. Rumsfeld now voiced 
his angry dissatisfaction at the lack of a more forceful US 
policy, but had no answer when Powel! asked what the 
alternative was. Powell was then asked to come back with a 
plan for more effective sanctions against Iraqi weapons 
programmes. 
During the summer of 2001 the deputies to the principals-
chaired by Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen J. 
Hadley, and including Paul Wolfowitz from the Defense 
Departmenr and Richard Armitage from the State Departmenr 
- worked to develop a policy proposal for Iraq. The outcome 
was a paper entitled "A Liberation Strategy". According to 
Bob Woodward it proposed "a phased strategy of pressuring 
Saddam", and discussed ways of exploiting opportunities that 
might present themselves, relying" heavily on the Iraqi 
opposition" .105 The paper contained no plan for US action for 
regime change. But US military action had been discussed in 
very tentative terms, with Wolfowitz as the main proponent. 
In the meantime the policy of intermittent US and British air 
strikes went on. Any change of that policy would have to 
await an intervention froIl1 the President. 
104 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack {New York: Simon & Schustcr, 2004), 
pp. 13-14. 
105 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 21. 
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September 2001-September 2002 
The dust had still not settled after tile 11 September terrorist 
attacks when, in the early afternoon, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld in an emergency meeting with his staff 
raised "the possibility of going after Iraq as a response to the 
terrorist attack". And at a meeting of Bush's war cabinet the 
next day Rumsfeld asked if this was not the opportunity "to 
launch against Iraq". At a Camp David meeting of top 
advisers four days later, however, the conclusion was to set 
Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden as the top priority for 
action. Iraq was discussed, but was pur on the back burner for 
possible later action. President Bush confirmed this on the 
following day to Condoleezza Rice: "We won't do Iraq now, 
we're putting Ira~ off. But eventually we'll have to return to 
that question."llJ As \X7olfowitz remembered it two years 
later, the question of Iraq "appeared to be about not whether 
but when" - a question of "tactics and timing".107 
Just under two months later Bush returned to the question. 
In a face-to-face meeting with Rumsfeld alone, he asked what 
kind of a war plan the Pentagon had for Iraq. When Rumsfeld 
explained that the existing post-Gulf War plan would have to 
he thoroughly revised - a process that might take months if 
not years - Bush told him to get started on it, and to get 
general Tommy Franks to look at "what it would take ro 
protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to". 
Franks was chief of U.S. Central Command, the area 
command for the Middle East. For the time being this 
planning process would be a secret, camouflaged as part of a 
general review of all existing war plans, although Rumsfeld 
wanted CIA Director George Tenet brought in at some stafte 
both for intelligence and for planning covert action in Iraq. os 
106 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 24-6. 
107 Wolfowirz as interviewed by Sam Tanncnhaus of Vallit)' Fair 9 May 
2003. News Transcript (llnitl"d States Department of Dcfcnsc [onlinc 30 
No\' 2005]). The insistent advocacy by Rumsfdd and Wolfowirz of 
action against Iraq, in the immediate aftermath of 11 September, is 
amply confirmed by The 9111 Commission Report. Final Report of tbe 
National Commission 011 Terrorist Attacks upolllhe United States (New 
York: NOrtOIl, 1004), pp. 334-6. 
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Officially, US policy on Iraq was still that of containment. 
At a public reception for humanitarian workers just returned 
from Afghanistan, Bush told reporters that Saddam must let 
the weapous inspectors back in. When asked what the 
consequences would be if that did not happen, Bush had 
wavered but then said "he'll find out" .109 Lest there was any 
doubt that the State Department was in tune with the 
president, Richard Armitage, Powell's deputy, explained to the 
New York Times on 1 December that Bush was putting 
pressure on Saddam to readmit the UN inspectors. But he 
added that "an Iraq with weapons of mass destruction is a 
threat to its neigh bars and ultimately to ourselves, and so we 
will do what we need to do to obviate that threat.,,110 
The wheels had started rolling. A possible US military 
action against Iraq to bring about regime change in that 
country was now on the agenda, but as yet without a plan and 
a timetable. What seems to have been curiously absent, 
according to the available sources, was a discussion about 
reasons or motivation. Wolfowitz, however, was in no doubt. 
Interviewed almost two years later, he said he had quickly 
concluded that Iraq had to be high on the target list for a 
counter-terrorism strategy. In order to prevent terrorists 
"getting access to so-called modern weapons" it was necessary 
not only to "root out these networks" but also to "get 
governments out of the business of supporting them". Saddam 
had those weapons, and he was "the only international figure 
other than Osama bin Laden who praised the attacks of 
September 11 th". Summing it up, Wolfowitz pointed to "three 
fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, 
the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal 
treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually ( ... ) there's a fourth 
overriding one which is the connection between the first 
two." 111 
108 Bob Woodward, PlUIl of Attack, pp. 1-3. 
109 Bob Woodward, Plall of Attack, p. 36, citing a New York Times repon 
27 November 200l. 
110 Bob Woodward, Pla1l of Attack, p. 39. 
111 Wolfowirz as interviewed by Sam Tanncnhaus of Vanity Pair 9 May 
2003. 
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It is essential, when reviewing the events and developments 
in Washington D.C. after the 11 September attacks, to keep in 
mind the tremendous shock and fears that gripped the entire 
American public. The dramatic footage of the airliners hitting 
the twin towers filled the television screens again and again. 
Harrowing tales of the gruesome deaths of those trapped 
inside as well as the heroic deeds of the rescue workers 
dominated the media. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
anxious nOt to be again caught by surprise, issued warnings 
that new attacks might be just around the corner, and urged 
everyone to be on the alert. Then, in November, came the 
anthrax scare, as five Americans were killed by mysterious 
mailings of anthrax powder in New York, Washington, and 
Florida. What would be next? One possible answer to that 
question hit Washington in early December, with intelligence 
reports that a Pakistani nuclear engineer had been selling 
know-how about nuclear weapons, and that documents from 
a bin Laden hideout in Afghanistan suggested a strong interest 
in such weapons. The reports apparently had "a dramatic 
impact on Bush", and Vice President Cheney again repaired to 
his hunker outside Washington.lll 
On Tuesday 29 January, 2002, it was time for President 
Bush's State of the Union speech, and the President had 
decided to raise the stakes. While giving much space to 
America's determination to promote democracy in the Middle 
East, he stressed the urgent need to eliminate the threats posed 
by terrorists and by regimes that were seeking weapons of 
mass destruction. He then devoted one sentence to North 
Korea, one to [ran, and five sentences to Iraq, and said: 
"States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis 
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger."l13 
112 Bob Woodward, Plall of Attack, pp. 45-7. 
113 Ibid., p. 92. 
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Pre-emptive or Preventive Action? 
In the process of US planning and preparations during the 
months that followed, two aspects need to be noted. First, the 
planning was proceeding under the assumption that any 
military campaign against Iraq would be an exclusively 
American venture. Secondly there seems to have been little 
discussion about intelligence that could support the claims 
about a Saddam Hussein/weapons of mass destruction/ 
international terrorism triad. The reports from the US and UK 
intelligence services on the subject were generally vague and 
inconclusive. A clue as to why this did not seem to matter 
much can be found in Vice President Cheney's thinking, as 
reported by Bob Woodward: 
After 9/1] it was clear to Cheney that the threat from 
terrorism had changed and grown tremendously. So 
two matters would have to change. First, the standard 
of proof would have to be lowered - smoking gun, 
irrefutable evidence would not have to be required for 
the United States to act to defend itself. Second, defense 
alone wasn't enough. They needed an offense.114 
All this pointed towards a seminal document entitled "The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America", 
ultimately signed and published under George W. Bush's name 
by the White House on 17 September 2002. A salient feature 
of that lengthy document has tended to be referred to as the 
pre-emptive strategy, which deals with action against 
imminent threats, whereas in fact it is a prescription for a 
preventive strategy against potential threats. I IS Already in the 
President's preamble it declares that "as a matter of common 
sense and self-defense, America will act against ... emerging 
threats before they are fully formed ... we must be prepared to 
defeat our enemies' plans, usinf the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation." 16 
114 Ibid., p. 30. 
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Contrary to many allegations in the media when this new 
US strategy was published, preventive war is not an American 
invention, nor is it a novelty in international affairs. Great 
powers have always retained the option of preventive 
belligerent action as a last resort. What is new in the post-
Cold War world is the use of the concept in the field of non-
proliferation of WMD. Tom Sauer of the Catholic University 
of Leuven, in a June 2004 essay in Defense and Security 
Analysis, lists the Clinton administration's 1998 missile attack 
on a Sudanese chemical plant, and operation Desert Fox 
against Iraq later that year, as early examples of such 
preventive attacks. 11 ? 
Moreover, the international conll1lunity has increasingly 
although gingerly heen moving towards accepting that 
preventive or pre-emptive military action can in certain cases 
be necessary. Partly inspired by the failure to intervene to stop 
the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and the 1999 genocide in 
Rwanda, as well as by the apparently successful intervention 
in Kosovo, there is a growing recognition that a state's 
sovereignty cannot always protect it from outside intervention 
against massive violations of the human rights of its 
inhabitants. Nor is that recognition necessarily limited to the 
protection of human rights. Interestingly, the suggestion that 
115 See in particular Garcrh Evans' article "'When is it right to fight", 
SIITuil1a/, voJ. 46, no. 3 (2004): 65: "The English language seems to be 
unique in having two different words here - 'prccmption' to describe 
responses to imminent threats, and 'pre\'cntion' for non~immincnt ones 
I ... ) The problem boils down to whether or not there is credible evidence 
of thc reality of the threat in question (taking into account, as always, 
both capability and specific intent) ( ... ) The question is not whether 
preventh'c military action can ever be taken: it is entirely within the 
scope of the Security Council's powers under Chapter VII ( ... ) The 
question is whether military action in response to non-imminent threats 
can ever be taken unilaterally." Sce also David P. Calleo's "The Broken 
West" in the same issue, esp. p. 31, and Robert Litwak'slucid analysis 
uNon-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change", Suruival, vol. 
45, no. 4, esp. pp. 16-17. 
116 Verbatim text of "'The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America", with the President's preamble, 17 September 2002 
(\X1ashington D.e.: The White House [online 6 5cp 2005]). 
117 Tom Sauer, "The 'Americanization' of EU Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Policy", Defellse and Security A1lalysis vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 113-131. 
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preventive use of force may be legitimate also looms large in 
the European Union's considerations of its non-proliferation 
policy. In a draft strategy agreed by the EU's General Affairs 
and External Relations Council in June 2003, it said that 
When these measures (including political dialogue and 
diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international 
law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of 
shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could 
be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a 
central role. llS 
More recently, the United Nations have also taken up the 
problem. In the winter of 2005 a High Level Panel appointed 
by the Secretary General presented its report on reform of the 
UN, including a chapter on "Collective security and the use of 
force" .119 While asserting that the Charter, through Article 51 
- concerning self-defence - and Chapter VII - on military 
measures authorised by the Security Council - is in itself 
adequate for the purposes, the Panel saw the need for the 
Security Council to adopt a set of "guidelines" or "criteria of 
legitimacy" in considering whether to "authorise or endorse" 
the use of military force through collective action under 
Chapter VII. The criteria mentioned are "seriousness of 
threat", 'tproper purpose", "last resort", "proportional 
means", and '~balance of consequences". If those criteria were 
met the Panel, in an important deviation from the hallowed 
principle of non-intervention, accepted that 
In the world of the twenty-first century, the 
international community does have to be concerned 
about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, 
weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible states, 
and much more besides, which may conceivably justify 
the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and 
118 Ibid.,p.I27. 
1"19 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Document N591565: "A 
more secure world: our shared responsibility". Repon of the High-level 
Panel of Threats, Challenges and Change (United Nations [on line 6 Sep 
200511· 
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before a latent threat becomes imminent. The question 
is not whether such action can be taken: it can, by the 
Security Council as the international community's 
collective security voice, at any time it deems that there 
is a threat to international peace and security. The 
Council may well need to be prepared to be much more 
proactive on these issues l taking more decisive action 
earlier, than it has been in the past. 
The Commission saw clear problems in the application of 
Artide 51, however. It acknowledged the right of a threatened 
state to take military action in self-defence "as long as the 
threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it 
and the action is proportionate", but went on: "The problem 
arises where the threat in question is not imminent but still 
claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with allegedly 
hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability." 
Having thus defined the problem, the Commission's report 
followed up with three paragraphs that by implication were 
directed against the US National Strategy: 
189. Can a state, without going to the Security 
Council, claim in these circumstances the right to act, 
in anticipatory self-defence, not just pre-emptively 
(against an imminent or proximate threat) but 
preventively (against a non-imminent or non-proximate 
one)? Those who say "yes" argue that the potential 
harm from some threats (e.g., terrorists armed with a 
nuclear weapon) is so great that one simply cannot risk 
waiting until they become imminent, and that less harm 
may be done (e.g. avoiding a nuclear exchange or 
radioactive fallout from a reactor destruction) by acting 
earlier. 
190. The short answer is that if there are good 
arguments for preventive military action, with good 
evidence to support them, they should be put to the 
Security Council, which can authorise such action if it 
choose~ to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by 
definition, time to pursue other strategies, including 
persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment -
and to visit again the military option. 
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191. For those impatient with such a response, the 
answer must be that, in a world fuIl of perceived 
potential threats, the risk to the global order and the 
norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be 
based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral 
preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed 
action, to be accepted. Allowing one to act is to allow 
all. 
In addition to stressing the central role of the UN Security 
Council, a key word in paragraph 190 is "good evidence". 
Although the Panel did not have much to say about the 
question of intelligence, it did specify, as a crucial test for the 
legitimacy of military action, that "there is credible evidence 
of the reality of the threat in question (taking into account 
both capability and specific intent)". But the Panel did not go 
on to state the obvious implications of the demand for 
credible evidence: namely that "plans", or "emerging threats", 
which are the expressions used in the US national strategy 
document, hardly constitute proximate or imminent threats 
that justify preventive or pre-emptive action. The 
determination of a proximate or imminent threat requires not 
just the best intelligence that may be available - which, as we 
shall see later, was not very good in relation to Iraq - but 
intelligence with a very high degree of certainty about intent. 
Thus the crucial problem with the US National Strategy is, as 
pointed out in a recent Rand Corporation study, that it 
presumes that there will be evidence to establish 
'''imminent threat" and underscore the legitimacy of the 
action undertaken. The criticism by the Congress and 
others regarding the intelligence on WMD preceding 
Operation Iraqi Freedom suggests, however, that 
"evidence" means different things to different people. 
Intelligence professionals would maintain that 
intelligence is largely inferential. Rarely does 
intelligence provide indisputable evidence. l2O 
120 Dcborah G. Bargcr, Toward a Ret'Olut;oll ill IlItelligence Atfairs (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Technical Report. 2(05), p. 17. 
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After 11 September 2001, the "emerging threat" that in the 
Bush administration's eyes would justify coercive action Was 
the alleged existence of a direct link between the Iraqi regime 
and al-Quaeda. As Wolfowitz said to the Washington Post in 
August 2003, "Disarming Iraq and the war on terror are not 
merely related. Disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological 
weapons and dismantling its nuclear weapons ptogram is a 
crucial part of winning the war on terror. ,,111 When asked by 
Fox News at the same time about the failure to find evidence 
of that direct link between Saddam and terrorism, he limited 
himself to remarking that intelligence about terrorism would 
always be "murky". But he went on to assert that "the lesson 
of 9/11 is that if you're not prepared to act 011 the basis of 
murky intelligence, then you're going to have to act after the 
fact, and after the fact now means after horrendous things 
have happened to this country.,,122 What this in fact meant, 
was that the decision-makers in Washington "concentrated 
not on the question of Saddam Hussein's culpability for 11 
September, but on the possibility that Iraq might at some 
point transfer WMD materials or components to al Qaeda or 
a similarly motivated non-state group" .123 The possibility -
not the probability. This matter of justification for coercive 
action against Iraq was to change during the summer of 2002, 
however, as the Bush administration decided to have at least a 
fling with multilateralism, United Nations version. 
121 
122 
l
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-, 
Quoted by Litwak in his SItTl'ivai article p. 17. 
Wolfowirz as interviewed on Fox News 27 July l003 (Uniced States 
Department of Defense Ioniinc 17 Aug 2005]). 
Dodge, Toby and Stcvcn Simon (eds.): "Iraq at the Crossroads: State and 
Society in the Shadow of Regime Change", AdeJpJ;i Paper, 354 
(London: IISS, 20(3), Introducrion, p. 13. 
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Chapter 4 
2002: Intelligence and 
Policymaking 
"Intelligence is not uniquely worthy of belief. 
Intelligence is uniquely worthy of scepticism." 
Lord Butler 
It is still far from clear how the Bush administration was 
persuaded to take the issue of Iraq back to the United 
Nations. Bur most commentators seem to give Tony Blair a 
leading role in the process, assisted by Colin Powel!. What is 
clear is that the effort to swing international opinion, and then 
the UN Security Council, towards a concerted policy on Iraq 
required a massive information campaign focused on the 
presumed existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In 
that campaign, intelligence would have to play a major role. 
In public perception, the strict secrecy surrounding the 
machinery, the process, and the product of intelligence has 
given it an almost mystic quality. Most students of 
intelligence, however, and many intelligence professionals, 
take a very cautious view of what intelligence can really 
provide. It has once famously been called "eat's eyes in the 
dark", and even those who would not go that far tend to 
stress that estimates or assessments, particularly when they try 
to look into the future, as they often do, are sometimes not 
much more than informed guesses based on often uncertain 
sources. This is particularly the case with estimates about an 
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adversary's intentions. As one insider has written, "short of 
some extraordinary stroke of luck, or genius, [the intentions] 
are likely to remain obscure. Intelligence targets are commonly 
closed societies, and even where this is not so, the foreign 
leaders themselves often do not see their way clearly, or 
determine it long in advance, and in most cases still prefer to 
keep their cards hidden." 124 
To the politicians and senior officials, who are supposed to 
absorb and if necessary react to its findings, intelligence often 
can appear as either an unwelcome addition to all the paper 
work they have to deal with, especially if the information goes 
against their pre-conceived ideas, or as useful tools if the 
intelligence can be used to suppurt the policy that they favour 
and wish to push through. Some retired statesmen are on 
record as saying that the)' seldom if ever bothered to read the 
lengthy assessments or estimates that are produced for them. 
In the United States, the CIA already in Harry T ruman's 
presidency began to produce brief daily summaries of 
international events (called "the Daily") that were distributed 
to the President and other senior officials. In 1961, however, 
President Kenned)' instituted a daily summary of all-source 
intelligence reports called the "President's Intelligence Check 
List" or PICL The concise nature of such documents - now 
called the "President's Daily Brief" (PDB) and presented by 
the Director of Central Intelligence himself - carries its own 
dangers in that the "caveats" necessarily tend to be omitted. 
Thus the most recent of the several investigations of US 
intelligence failures found 
flaws that were inherent in the format of the PDBs - a 
series of short 'articles' often based on current 
intelligence reporting that are presented to the 
President each morning. Their brevity leaves little room 
for doubts or nuance - and their 'headlines' designed to 
grab the reader's attention leave no room at a11. 125 
124 Percy Crndock, Knou' Your Enemy (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 
291. 
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The relationship between intelligence and policymaking has 
been the subject of much debate both before and after the Iraq 
war. Intelligence experts of the old school, such as the 
veterans of the long since defunct Board of National Estimates 
of the CIA, tended to regard intelligence analysis as an 
academic or at least intellectual discipline that should be 
untainted by politics. This has also been the ideal of Britain's 
JIC - the Joint Intelligence Committee. In the words of John 
Scarlett, its chairman: "It ... has a long tradition of providing 
independent, objective advice, drawing on all sources, 
including the most secret sources, to the Government ... " 126 A 
more realistic view, from the chairman of the lIC in 1985-
1992, holds that intelligence and policy "should be close but 
distinct. Too distinct and assessments become an in-growing, 
self-regarding activity producing little or no work of interest 
to the decision-makers ... Too close a link and policy begins 
to play back on estimates, producing the answers the policy-
makers would like ... The analysts become courtiers, whereas 
their proper function is to report their findings, almost always 
unpalatable, without fear or favour." 127 
However, the trend in both countries has been to bring the 
process of intelligence assessment closer to the policymakers. 
In Britain there has been an expansion of the membership of 
the lIC so that it now appears as a "forum of mixed 
intelligence chiefs and senior policy people, acting in an 
intelligence mode" .128 Since 1968 the lIC has been supported 
by an Assessments Staff, "staffed in the main by normal 
secondments from elsewhere in the public sphere, including 
policy departments with a strong Foreign Office element 
among them,,129, and located in the Cabinet Office's 
125 The Commission 011 the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destmctioll. Repon to the President, 31 
March 2005 (Washington D.e., 2005), frequently referred to as the 
Silbcrman/Robb report, p. SO. 
126 Hutton Inquiry weh<;itf', Hearing Tr:l.llscripts, section 80 [001inc 6 Scp 
2005J. 
127 Perey Cradock, KnoUJ YOllr blem}~ p. 296. 
128 Michael licrman, "'Intelligence and the Iraqi threat: British Joint 
Intelligence after Butler", R US! jOllrlml, August (2004). 
129 Ibid. 
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Intelligence and Security Secretariat, whose head is the 
chairman of JIe. This, according to a former insider, has 
meant that "the most powerful voices tend to be those who 
are in a sense 'amateurs' - professional diplomats, senior 
service officers and other Whitehall officials, either as JIC 
members or on secondment to the Assessments staff - rather 
than career intelligence professionals."J30 But it is the JIC 
chairman who presents the assessments to the Prime Minister. 
In the United States the CIA's Board of National Estimates, 
whose products were often criticised as being too "academic" 
with their detailed "on the one hand" and "on the other 
hand" assessments, was in the 1970s replaced by a number of 
National Intelligence Officers who now form the National 
Intelligence Council, reporting their estimates to the DCI - the 
Director of Central Intelligence. The estimates are then 
formally approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. 
While the old ideals of objectivity and dispassionate analysis 
are still held in high regard, the American system is such that 
the estimate "was and is the Director's estimate, and its 
findings are his" .131 And it is the DCI who reports to the 
White House. Thus the crucial nexus in the relationship 
between the intelligence agencies and the policymakers is 
embodied in the persons of the chairman of the JIC, in Britain, 
and the DCI, in the United States. 
When we now know much more about the intelligence 
process than before, this is due to the spate of official 
investigations and inquiries sparked off by what are widely 
regarded as intelligence failures. In the United States, the 
shock of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks led to the 
establishment of the "National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States", which published its report in 
2004.132 In July 2004 there was published a report from the 
U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee on intelligence assessments 
130 Michacl Herman, "'The Role of the British 1I1lclligt:uct; Comminee! An 
Historical Perspective", in Le. Jensscn and O. Riste (eds.), Intellige1lce 
ill the Cold War: Organisation. Role. mId International Coo/Jeratioll 
(Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2001), p. 37. 
131 Report 011 the U.S. Intelligence Commwzity's Prewar bttelligellce 
Assessments ... , p. 10. 
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regarding Iraq.133 This was followed in March 2005 by a 
special report to the President on US intelligence capabilities 
regarding weapons of mass destruction. 134 In the United 
Kingdom there was, first, the inquiry led by a distinguished 
Law Lord, Lord Hutton, into the circumstances that led to the 
death by suicide of Dr. David Kelly. Dr. Kelly was one of the 
British Ministry of Defence's leading experts on weapons of 
mass destruction, and was alleged to be the source of media 
claims about pressure by No.IO Downing Street on the British 
intelligence community.135 While that inquiry was still going 
on the Intelligence and Security Committee of the Parliament 
published a critical report on British intelligence relating to 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Finally, in July 2004, a 
Committee of Privy Counsellors led by former Cabinet 
Secretary Lord (Robin) Butler published a major report 
entitled "Review of intelligence on weapons of mass 
destruction" ,136 
The British Government's Dossier of September 
2002 
The initial reason for deciding to publish an official account of 
the British government's assessment of the situation in regard 
to Iraqi WMD was, according to the Butler report, to "inform 
public understanding of the case for stronger action (although 
not necessarily military action) to enforce Iraqi compliance 
with its obligations ... ,,137 It is worth noting the words "the 
case for stronger action". Britain had together with the United 
States been consistent advocates in the Security Council for 
maintaining the pressure against Saddam Hussein, whereas the 
133 
134 
135 
136 
1.)7 
The 9111 Commission Report. Final Report of tbe National Commission 
011 Terrorist Attacks IIpOIl tbe United States (New York: Norron, 20(4). 
Sec note 131. 
See note 125. 
Lord HuctoJ1's report was published in January 1004. Before riut, 
however, tile verbatim reports on the hearings had been available on the 
Internet, here cited as the Hurton Inquiry v,,·chsirc. 
See notC' 95. 
Review of intelligellce 011 W/eapons of Mass Destructioll"" para. 313. 
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other permanent members of the Council had wavered in their 
support. The purpose of publishing such an account was 
therefore not so much to convince the public tlHlt Iraq had or 
was developing WMD. The consensus among the public and 
the media, in Britain and internationally, was that Saddam 
had or was developing such weapons. What the British 
government needed was to convince the public that those 
weapons represented such a serious threat that stronger and 
more determined action, in one form or another, was urgently 
necessary. When seen against the many reports that Iraq was 
still actively trying to undermine the sanctions regime, and 
was unwilling to allow inspectors into the country to search 
for WMD, and in view of the weakening support in public 
opinion and among the members of the Security Council for 
maintaining and enforcing sanctions, it is perfectly 
understandable that the British Government wished to 
convince its own people that its sanctions policy against Iraq 
was both right and necessary. 
Shortly before the British government went public with its 
own assessment, the case for action was strengthened hy the 
publication, on 8 September, of a dossier compiled by the 
highly regarded International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IlSS). Presented as an objective, dispassionate assessment, it 
concluded that "The retention of WMD capacities by Iraq is 
self-evidently the core objective of the regime, for it has 
sacrificed all other domestic and foreign policy goals to this 
singular aim." More specifically, it stated: 
A reasonable net assessment is that Iraq has no nuclear 
weapons but could build one quickly if it acquired 
sufficient fissile material. It has extensive biological 
weapons capabilities and a smaller chemical weapons 
stockpile. It has a small force of ballistic missiles with 
a range of 650 km, that are capable of delivering CBW 
warheads, and has prepared other delivery methods for 
CBW, including manned aircraft and UAVs. Sooner or 
later, it seems likely that the curr~nt Iraqi regime will 
eventually achieve its objectives.1.:I8 
138 "Iraq WMD Dossier Statement", IISS Press Release, 8 September 2002. 
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In September Tony Blair decided to recall Parliament for 24 
September, and commissioned a dossier to be ready before 
that date. It was also decided that the dossier should be 
published, and that it should draw mainly on material from 
intelligence - in itself an unprecedented event. Against that 
background the two senior intelligence officials - Sir David 
Omand as the Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the 
Cabinet Office, and John Scarlett as chairman of the JIC -
decided that the .IIC would take the responsibility for the 
production of the dossier. According to the Butler report they 
took that decision "to ensure that its content properly 
reflected the judgements of the intelligence community ... " 139 
However, Ministers and senior officials have also adduced 
another motive: " ... a Government document that claimed to 
be underpinned by intelligence would have been met with 
immediate scepticism unless it was evident that the lIC had 
endorsed its content.,,140 The decision by the chairman of the 
JIC to take responsibility for the dossier enabled the Prime 
Minister to state, in his foreword to the published dossier, that 
it was "based, in large part, on the work of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC)". 
The 50-page dossier, entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government", was 
published on 24 September, to coincide with the special 
session of Parliament. It did not at that time arouse much 
debate. Its prose was cautiously factual, even somewhat dull, 
and it did not in itself point to any particular policy option, 
such as war. Hans Blix, the chairman of UNMOVIC, when 
asked whether he thought the dossier was making a case for 
war, was clear: "No, it was not. I saw it as a case for 
inspection.,,141 Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his foreword, 
was a little more specific, demanding "that the inspectors 
must be allowed back to do their job properly; and that if he 
fSaddam Hussein] refuses, or if he makes it impossible for 
them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the 
139 Ret!ielt! of Intelligence 011 Weap01lS of Mass Destmctioll ... , para. 320. 
140 Ibid., para. 321. 
141 Ibid., para. 317. 
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international community will have to act". But Blair's 
foreword was also quite adamant about wbat the dossier 
amounted to: 
What I believe the assessed intelligence has established 
beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce 
chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in 
his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has 
been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile 
programme. 
Every element of that statement reflected what the JIC 
summary said. But whereas the JIC, in its summary of the 
dossier, presented its conclusions as "judgements", Blair saw 
them as being "beyond doubt". 
A thorough investigation of the semantic process that 
intelligence undergoes before it is presented to the public is 
clearly not possible without full access to the intermediate 
stages between what is called "raw intelligence" and the 
finished product. But the Butler report came as close as 
anyone could in pointing to the problems and pitfalls inherent 
in that process. There is first the permanent, often overstated 
but perfectly legitimate, concern of the intelligence community 
not to reveal its "sources and methods". Second comes the 
balancing act between on the one hand revealing the inherent 
limitations of intelligence products, given the uncertainty of 
both the source material and its analysis, and on the other 
hand the need to provide assessments that are sufficiently clear 
for their political masters to act upon. Then, as the Butler 
report states: 
Intelligence assessment is necessarily based heavily on 
judgement, relying on such material as intelligence has 
provided. It is not simply a matter of reporting this 
material but of presenting the judgements that flow 
from it to an experienced readership. Explaining those 
judgements to a wider public audience is a very 
different and difficult presentational task.14l 
142 Ibid., para. 327. 
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In other words, when reporting intelligence assessments to the 
regular recipients of such reports, like cabinet ministers and 
senior offjcials, a more acadenlic "on the one hand" and "on 
the other hand" style, full of reservations and footnotes or 
"caveats", can be used. But such language can easily confuse 
and irritate the general public. Thus the Butler report, 
comparing the dossier with an assessment produced by the lIC 
for internal consumption two weeks earlier, on 9 September, 
noted that in the dossier "points were run together and 
caveats on the intelligence were dropped. The most significant 
difference was the omission of warnings included in lIC 
assessments about the limited intelligence base on which some 
aspects of those assessments were being made. ,,143 To give but 
one example of the effect of such presentational problems in 
the 24 September dossier, taken from the Butler report: the 9 
September assessment stated as follows concerning Iraq's 
chemical and biological weapons: "Intelligence remains 
limited and Saddam's own unpredictability complicates 
judgements about Iraqi use of these weapons. Much of this 
paper is necessarily based on judgement and assessment." In 
the dossier those caveats were reduced to the blindingly 
obvious statement that "This intelligence cannot tell us about 
everything." 144 
It is important to note, when assessing the British dossier, 
that its "judgements" on Iraq's WMD differed as to the 
categories of weapons. They were at their most conclusive 
regarding chemical and biological weapons. The dossier 
concluded that Iraq "continued to produce chemical and 
biological agents", partly in "mobile laboratories", and had 
"military plans" for the use of such weapons, some of which 
"are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them". 
On ballistic missiles, the dossier concluded that Iraq had 
missiles capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads 
with ranges far beyond that allowed by the United Nations. 
143 Ibid., para. 330. 
144 Ibid., p. 80-81. 
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The dossier was less certain when it came to nuclear 
weapons, stating only that Iraq had been trying to obtain the 
necessary technology, materials and uranium for developing 
such weapons. In the detailed assessment the JIC reported 
"intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant 
quantities of uranium from Africa". On the controversial 
"aluminium tubes" it was stated that Iraq had attempted to 
get large quantities of them, but "there is no definitive 
intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme". 
The debate on the British dossier 
The debate on the British government's September 2002 
dossier developed in two stages. In the first stage, during the 
early months of 2003, criticism of the government was 
triggered by two separate events: first, the government's 
publication in February of another paper on Iraqi WMD, 
which soon became roundly condemned as a clumsy Cabinet 
Office effort to bolster the government's case. Then there was 
the allegation by a BBC reporter that the September dossier 
had been "sexed up" by the Prime Minister's "spin doctors". 
That allegation brought to the forefront Dr. David Kelly, a 
Defence Ministry expert on WMD claimed by the BBC as 
their source, who then committed suicide. His death led to an 
official inquiry chaired by Lord Hutton, whose detailed public 
hearings, recorded verbatim on the Internet, produced a mass 
of new information on rhe process that led to the September 
dossier. 145 The dominant issue at that stage Was whether the 
government had put political pressure on the intelligence 
organs to strengthen its case for stronger action against Iraq. 
We shall return to that issue below. 
The second stage of the debate on the September dossier 
began in earnest with the July 2004 publication of the report 
by a committee, chaired by Lord Butler,146 whose remit was 
to review the performance of the British intelligence 
145 The Hunon Inquiry wcbsite [online 12 Scp 2003]. 
146 Robin Butler {Baron Butler of Rockwcll} was Sccrctan' to the Cabinet 
Office and head of the UK Home Civil Service 1988-1998. 
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community in the events leading up to the war in Iraq. By that 
tinlc, of course, a whole year's search on the ground in Iraq 
had failed to find any of the WMD which the dossier had 
claimed that Iraq possessed. Although couched in impeccably 
balanced and moderate language, the Butler report revealed 
that the September dossier had failed to reflect the 
considerable uncertainties surrounding the judgements of the 
Joint Intelligence Committee - that the .IIC had so to speak 
"sexed up" its product beyond what was warranted by the 
"raw intelligence". Even more damaging to the reputation of 
British intelligence was the revelation that three of the five 
human intelligence sources, which the famous Secret 
Intelligence Service had relied on, were in fact unreliable.147 In 
particular, the Butler report reinforced the conclusion of the 
Parliament's Intelliffience and Security Committee, published in 
September 2003,14 that the dossier's most alarming claim 
had been misleading. This was the claim that the "Iraqi 
military are able to deploy these [chemical and biological 
weapons] within 45 minutes of a decision to do so", which the 
Prime Minister's foreword interpreted as meaning that some 
of the weapons could be "ready within 45 minutes of an order 
to use them". Although the intelligence report in fact referred 
only to battlefield weapons, the wording in the dossier was 
widely believed to mean that the weapons in question could 
hit British bases in Cyprus. 
To sum up, Intelligence and Security Committee's report, 
and in particular the Butler report, amounted to a pretty 
severe indictment of the performance of MI6, otherwise 
known as the Secret Intelligence Service (515), for failing to 
exercise sufficiently critical judgement of their sources and the 
147 Ret'iew o(Intelligellce on W1eap0l1S of Mass Destmetion ... , para. 434-6. 
148 Iraqi Wedpol1s of lvlass Destrtlction-11lfelligcnce and Assesslllents, 
Imclligence and Security Committee (London: The Stationery Office, 9 
September 2003), esp. p. 7: "As the 45 minutes claim was new tu its 
readers, the COntext of the intelligence and any assessment needed to be 
explained. The faCt that it waS assessed co refer to battlefield chemical 
and biological munitions and their movementS on the battlefield, not to 
any other form of chemical or biological attack, should have been 
highlighted in the dossier." 
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reports provided. Sources close to SIS have since sought to 
explain the weakness of their reporting from Iraq by citing an 
overload of other high priority tasks. Parliament's Security 
and Intelligence Committee has also pointed to the budget 
cutbacks that SIS and the other agencies had suffered after the 
end of the Cold War. 149 
Less severe, but still very critical, was the Butler report's 
conclusions on the JIC's authorship of the September dossier. 
On the way from JIC assessments to the dossier "warnings 
were lost about the limited intelligence base on which some of 
these assessments were being made". This "left with readers 
the impression that there was fuller and firmer intelligence 
behind the judgements than was the case ... We conclude that 
it was a serious weakness that the .IIC's warnings on the 
limitations of the intelligence underlying its judgements were 
not made sufficiently clear in the dossier. "bO In British civil 
service understatement, "serious weakness" is strong language 
indeed. It is worth noting that Butler felt it necessary to add a 
paragraph to the effect that the criticism should not be taken 
to mean that John Scarlett, the chairman of JIC, should not 
become the next Chief of SIS. 
Were the errors for which SIS and JIC were criticised due 
to political pressure? Were they a result of the British 
government and its "spin doctors" leaning on the intelligence 
community to produce the kind of results that would serve 
their political purposes? The JIC chairman, the parliamentary 
Intelligence and Security Committee, the report from the 
Hutton inquiry, and the Butler report all answered those 
questions in the negative. The Committee concluded: "We are 
content that the JIC has not been subjected to political 
pressures, and that its independence and impartiality has not 
been compromised in any way. The dossier was not 'sexed up' 
by Alastair Camp bell or anyone else." 151 
149 All1lttai Re[}ort 2003-2004, Intelligence and Security Committee 
(London: The Stationery Office, June 2004), p. 38. 
150 Rei/jell' o(JlItefligencl! 011 WeapOIlS of Mass Destruction . . " para. 464-5. 
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However, the fact that strong judgements were formed on 
the basis of uncertain intelligence, and that those judgements 
all went in the "worst case" direction, still requires an 
explanation. One of the first analyses to suggest an 
explanation was an article by Martin Woollacott in the 
Guardian Weekly in February 2004, under the heading "Spies 
obsessed by Sad dam. Mistrust led to Iraq intelligence 
failures." With reference to the Hutton inquiry into the death 
of Dr. David Kelly, he wrote: 
In Britain the Hutton report's rejection of the argument 
that the available intelligence was exaggerated by 
politicians may have let the government off too lightly. 
But it does have the virtue of showing that the 
government and intelligence services had essentially the 
same mindset on Iraq. That mindset was exemplified 
by Dr. David Kelly himself. Dr. Kelly believed that 
Saddam almost certainly had some limited stocks of 
chemical and biological weapons, some capacity to 
restart production, some very limited means of 
delivery, and some hidden but very scaled down 
research programmes. 152 
Recently a veteran of the British Intelligence Community, 
Michael Herman, has refined that analysis by bringing in the 
concepts of "group-think" and Hprevailing wisdom". "Most 
of the world was convinced that saddam Hussein was 
concealing operational WMD weapons, and intelligence was 
locked into the process of creating and confirming this 
conviction.,,153 The British government wanted a strong 
document to support its case for increasing the pressure on 
saddam. There was a revealing moment in the Hurton inquiry 
when the questioner read out an em ail from someone in the 
151 Iraqi Wfeapolls of Mass Destmctioll ... , p. 42. Alastnir Camp bell was 
Tony Blair's PreSS and Communications Officer, and figured 
prominently in alleg:ltiolls of political interference in thc production of 
the dossier. 
152 Guardiall W/eekir, February 5-112004. 
153 Paper given to the British Intelligence and Security Association at the 
University of Warwick, December 2004, quoted by permission of the 
author. 
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Cabinet Office to the intelligence agencies during the drafting 
of the September dossier. It stated that "No. 10 through the 
Chairman want the document to be as strong as possible 
within the bounds of available intelligence. This is therefore a 
last (!) call for any items that agencies think can and should be 
included." When asked about this, John Scarlett replied that 
"you have to remember that the Joint Intelligence Committee 
itself was anxious to produce as strong a document as 
possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods." 154 
The United States dossier, October 2002 
Ever since New Year 2002 the US military had been working 
on war plans for Iraq. And from July 2002 a covert action 
team was at work in northern Iraq, trying in various ways to 
penetrate the Iraqi military and intelligence services. But 
President Bush's stock answer when questioned by reporters 
about Iraq was that he had no war plan on his desk. Then, on 
5 August 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell met privately 
with the president. After pointing out the many risks inherent 
in any unilateral action by the US, Powell brought up an 
alternative: "You can still make a pitch for a coalition or U.N. 
action to do what needs to be done." Rush was already 
scheduled to speak to the UN General Assembly on 12 
September. PoweII now argued for using that speech not just 
to make a statement about US policy toward Iraq, but also to 
make a serious attempt to internationalise the issue. Without 
such an attempt even Britain's support would be in doubt. 
Vice President Cheney tried to argue against, since taking the 
issue to the UN "would invite a never-ending process of 
debate, compromise and delay". When he finally agreed, it 
was on the basis of making the speech something of an 
ultimatum to the UN: Act decisivelv, or be condemned to 
irrelevance. IS5 . 
154 Hutton Inquiry \".,cbsirc, Hearing Transcripts, Section 162. 
155 Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 151 and "157. 
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Bush himself had not yet taken a public stand on whether 
Saddam actually had WMD. In the "Axis of evil" State of the 
Union speech on 29 January, 2002, the talk was of the three 
states in question "seeking weapons of mass destruction", and 
on 16 August, speaking to reporters, he said that Sad dam 
"desires" such weapons. Cheney, however, went further, with 
a speech that also seemed virtually to pre-empt the effect of 
any appeal to the UN. In an address to the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars on 26 August he declared that a "return of the 
inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his 
[Saddam's] compliance with UN resolutions ... Simply stated, 
there is no doubt that Sad dam Hussein now has weapons of 
mass destruction [and] there is no doubt that he is amassing 
them to use against Our friends, against our allies and against 
us." 156 In a classic "worst case" warning, Cheney highlighted 
the scenario of Saddam in possession of nuclear weapons: 
Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and 
seated atop 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, 
Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek 
domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a 
great proportion of the world's energy supplies, directly 
threaten America's friends throughout the region, and 
subject the t}nited States or any other nation to nuclear 
blackmail.1) 7 
Such statements can be seen as confirming the impression, 
brought back from Washington and reported to a Downing 
Street meeting on 23 July 2002 by the head of SIS, that "the 
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy ( ... ) 
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, 
justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.,,158 
On 7 September, after a meeting with Tony Blair, Bush 
then followed suit: Speaking to reporters together with Blair, 
he said: "Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass 
156 Ibid., p. 164. 
157 Quoted in David Barsrow's exhaustive study .. Hm .... the White House 
Embraced Disputed Arms Intelligence", New York Times, 3 October 
2004. 
158 "'The Secret Downing Street Memo", Sl/nday Times, 1 May 2005. 
86 FORSVARSSTUDJER 412005 
destruction." It is not yet clear where that new certainty came 
from. The next morning the New York Times, in a front page 
story headlined "U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-
Bomb Parts" that came to dominate the TV talk shows that 
day, reported on Iraq's attempts to buy aluminium tubes that 
could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for a bomb.159 
Appearing on CNN, National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice asserted that the tubes in question " were only really 
suited for nuclear weapons programs" .1 60 And from then On 
President Bush's own statements left no opening for doubts 
about Saddam's possession of biological and chemical 
weapons, as well as his attempts to obtain the wherewithal to 
make nuclear weapons. 
In contrast to the situation in Britain and Europe there was 
little or no public demand in the United States for the 
administration to prove its case against Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction. In the wake of president Bush's "conversion" to 
certainty about Iraq's possession of WMD, however, the 
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator 
Robert Graham, on 11 September formally requested the CIA 
to provide a new intelligence estimate on Iraq. As Bob 
Woodward notes in his book, the CIA had until then "never 
declared categorically that Saddam possessed weapons of mass 
destruction". Consistent with the Presidenes statements before 
7 September, their estimates, and DCI Tenet's testimony to the 
Senate Intelligence Committee on 6 February 2002, claimed 
only that Iraq was seeking WMD. Now, against the 
background of the recent assertive statements by Cheney and 
Bush, the CIA "did agree reluctantly to do a rushed National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's WMD capability" .1 61 
The work on the NIE took three weeks, resulting in a Top 
Secret 92 page document ultimately certified by the National 
Foreign Intelligence Board. A 25 page unclassified "dossier", 
entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction", was issued for 
public consumption two days later. This document was not a 
159 Woodward, Plall of Attack, p. 178-9. 
160 BarstOw, "How the White House Embraced ... " 
161 Woodward, Plall of Attack, p. 194-5. 
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sanitised version of the Top Secret Estimate. It was an 
assessment that the CIA had been working on since the spring, 
in response to a request from the National Security Council. 
The "Key Judgments" part was however a declassified version 
of its counterpart in the NIE. The main difference was that, 
like in the British case, the "caveats" had been eliminated. 162 
Comparing the British dossier to its CIA counterpart, it is 
impossible not to be struck by the ominously peremptory tone 
of the latter. At the top of its "Key judgments" it stated simply 
that "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons". On 
nuclear weapons it stated: "If Baghdad acquires suificient 
weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a 
nuclear weapon within a year." It singled out the aluminium 
tubes as particularly significant: "All intelligence experts agree 
that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes 
could be used in a centrifuge entichment program. Most 
intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but 
some believe that these tubes are probably intended for 
conventional weapons programs." Less certain, but potentially 
more alarming, was the judgement that Iraq was developing 
an un manned aerial vehicle (UA V) "that most analysts believe 
probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents ... 
Baghdad's UAVs - especially if used for delivery of chemical 
and biological (CBW) agents - could threaten Iraq's 
neighbors, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United 
States if brought close to, or into, the U.S. Homeland." 
Seldom if ever can a serious intelligence estimate have built a 
worst-case scenario on such tenuous hypotheses. 
The rwo-page "Key Judgments" was followed by over 
twenty pages entitled "Discussion". Here the certainties and 
alarming prospects were interspersed with qualifications and 
reservations, even suggesting that the intelligence basis for the 
judgements was in some cases limited. One remarkable 
paragraph deserves to be quoted: 
162 Report 011 the U.S. IlIteIligellce Community'S Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments ... , p. 186-8. 
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Limited i11sight into activities since 1998 clearly show 
that Baghdad has used the absence of UN inspectors to 
repair and expand dual-use and dedicated missile-
development facilities and to increase its ability to 
produce WMD.163 
Information that has since become available has revealed that 
some of the intelligence agencies distanced themselves from 
the NIE on some points. The U.S. Air Force's Director for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance disagreed with 
the judgement on UA Vs, stating that the UAVs probably had 
"a primary role of reconnaissance". And both the Department 
of Energy's intelligence unit and the State Department's 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research disputed the judgement 
that the infamous aluminium tubes were intended for uranium 
enrichment. But those dissenting opinions were buried in the 
Top Secret NIE and not shared with the public. 
The debate on the US dossier 
A scathing verdict on the U.S. Intelligence Community'S 
October 2002 NIE was delivered by the Senate Intelligence 
Committee in its nearly 500 page report, published - with 
many deletions - in July 2004. The Committee's overall 
conclusions could hardly he more devastating: 
Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence 
Community's October 2002 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs (or 
\Y/eapOllS of Mass Destruction, either overstated~ or 
were not supported by, the underlying intelligence 
reporting. A series of failures, particularly in the 
analytic tradecraft, led to the mischaracterization of the 
intelligence.164 
163 Iraq's WC,lPOIlS of Alass Dcstmctiol1 Programs, Director of Central 
Intelligence, Washington D.e., October 2002, p. 5. Emphasis added. 
164 Report on the V.S. Intelligence COl/mlllnit)" P"'l'ar Intelligence 
Assessments ... , p.14. 
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That condemnation applied to the judgments about nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons. Only the assessments 
concerning development of ballistic missiles were found to be 
reasonable and accurate. The Senate Committee's explanation 
for such a massive intelligence failure was similar to that from 
the Butler report on the failures of British intelligence. It had 
been a case of "group think", permeated by "received 
. d " WIS om . 
More recently, in March 2005, yet another critical report 
has been issued, under the long title of "The Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction". That commission, chaired by 
Judge Laurence H. Silberman and Senator Charles S. Robb, 
had a wider remit than the Senate Committee in that it also 
studied the cases of Iran and North Korea. But most of what 
it had to say about the latter has been excised from the 500-
page report. On the matter of Iraq it does not add much to 
what the Senate Committee has already reported, except 
concerning hiological weapons. It points out that while 
previous estimates for the intelligence community had only 
assessed that Iraq could have biological weapons, the October 
2002 estimate assessed "with high confidence" that Iraq had 
such weapons. That change of view "was based largely on 
information from a single source - Curveball - who indicated 
that Iraq had mobile facilities for producing BW agents". 
Curveball, however, was a source "whose credibility came 
into question around the time of the publication of the NIE 
and collapsed under scrutiny in the months following the 
war" .165 More seriously, that information from Curve ball 
was the basis for Colin Powell's dramatic performance at the 
crucial meeting of the United Nations Security Council in 
February 2003. 
On the much discussed question of political pressure on the 
intelligence analysts to come up with answers that suited the 
policy-makers, the Committee - like its British counterpart -
concluded that they found no evidence of such pressure. But it 
165 The Commission 011 the 1Iltell(r:;ence Capabilities ... , p. 81. 
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should be noted that a closely related question - whether 
statements by government officials accurately reflected the 
intelligence available to them - was deferred by the 
Committee for later study. As the New York Times said in its 
editorial on 1 April 2005, the Senate Committee "has yet to 
complete and publish its investigation of the handling of the 
Iraq intelligence". The Silberman/Robb commission simply 
says that it was "not authorized" to look into the question of 
political pressure. But it adds the following admission: "It is 
hard to deny that intelligence analysts worked in an 
environment that did not encourage scepticism about the 
conventional wisdom." Thus, in the US case, much more than 
in the UK case, the indirect pressure on the intelligence 
community of peremptory statements and conclusions by 
senior officials such as Vice President Cheney must have 
played their part in the formation of the "group think". Step 
by step, from the analysts, through the National Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, to DCI George Tenet's famous 
assertion that Iraq's possession of WMD was a "slam 
dunk,,166case, i.e. beyond doubt, the publicly stated opinion 
of their political masters became steadily more difficult to 
gaInsay. 
Lessons Learned? 
There can be no doubt that the record of the intelligence 
communities in the tun-up to the Iraq war stands as an 
example of that often used but sometimes misused expression 
of "intelligence failure". In the case of the US agencies this 
also came on top of another failure with a much greater public 
impact, namely the failure to predict and prevent the 9111 
terrorist attacks. But both the US and British intelligence 
agencies clearly face a long and hard process in their efforts to 
regain the confidence of their customers, not to speak of the 
166 The expression "'slam dunk" comes from basketball, and denotes n. case 
where the player scores by practically hanging on the basket ami 
pushing the ball through. Tenet's assertion came aftcr the President, at a 
meeting on 21 December 2001, twice pressed him to state how confident 
he was that the intelligence was reliable. 
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public. In regard to Iraq it was, firstly, a failure in the process 
of collection of intelligence. After the departure of UNSCOM 
from Iraq the agencies simply did not have adequate sources 
to enable them to provide reasonably good information of 
what was going on in Iraq in the matter of weapons of mass 
destruction. This is something the agencies were obviously 
aware of, but could do little to remedy in the short run. Then 
there was the failure properly to analyse and evaluate the 
intelligence reports received, taking into full account their 
often dubious origin, quality and reliability. An intelligence 
failure of such proportions, and with such serious results, 
suggests that the intelligence communities may never regain 
the standing that they generally seem tu have enjoyed for so 
long. Yet their role is important, and may become even more 
so as the international community moves toward acceptance 
of the need for preventive or pre-emptive military action. 
The need for repair and reform is therefore urgent. The 
acquisition of reliable sources of human intelligence is a long-
haul process that cannot be accelerated by crash recruiting 
programmes and sizable budget increases. More can be done 
through organisational reforms, many of which were 
foreshadowed in the various investigations that have been 
carried out. Organisational reforms currently being instituted 
show that SIS, for one, recognises the need to put its own 
house in order. Among other things the collection of 
intelligence will be separated from the quality control, with 
the latter being exercised by experienced senior analysts with 
the right "to monitor every operation, check the flow and 
accuracy of information from any source and demand access 
to all the paperwork" .167 Thus SIS has restored a separate 
requirements department with, as The Economist has put it, 
"a licence to be awkward". This will be complemented in the 
Cabinet Office by a "challenger-in-chief to work with the 
assessments staff to test material at the final stage of 
processing before it reaches 'the high table' of British 
intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Committee" .168 This has 
167 "1-'linding the minders"', Times, 12 January 2005. 
168 "Cats' En~s in the Dark", Economist, 17 March 2005. 
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now been put into effect by the creation of a post as "Head of 
Intelligence Analysis". The British Cabinet has also increased 
the assessments staff in the Cabinet Office by about one-third. 
Also, in an effort to enhance the scepticism of ministers and 
other receivers of intelligence assessments, the Cabinet has 
issued a kind of readers' guide that stresses the "Iimitations On 
the scope of intelligence which have to be recognised by Its 
ultimate recipients", of which the most important is its 
"incompleteness" ,169 
In the United States the learning process has mainly 
consisted in repairing the deficiencies demonstrated by the 
9/11 intelligence failures, many of which were caused by 
"fault lines within our government - between foreign and 
domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies" .170 
The reform proposals have accordingly so far resulted mostly 
in planned organisation changes, highlighted by the 
appointment of ambassador John Negroponte as Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI). Comments about the 
reorganising effort have been heavily imbued with scepticism, 
and predictions that the pervasive "turf wars" between the 
fifteen or so intelligence agencies will hardly be eliminated by 
adding yet another structure.171 Doubts centre on the DNI's 
chances of wresting control of the Defense Department's 
intelligence empire from DonalJ Rumsfeld. 
One serious consequence of the "turf wars" has been the 
lack of exchange of information between agencies. General 
Michael V. Hayden, now Deputy to the DNI, recently testified 
to a Senate Sub-Committee that this has now been changed as 
a result of the intelligence failures on Iraq. General Hayden, 
then head of the National Security Agency, sat on the 
National Intelligence Board when it approved the October 
2002 Estimate. In his testimony he admitted that his approval 
169 Sec Michacl Evans' article ""Idiots guide' for ministers on how to read 
intelligence", Times 23 March 2005. 
170 The 9/11 Report ... , Preface, p . .x-vi. 
171 For a fascinating historical survey of efforts to reform D.S. intelligence 
sec M. Warner and J.K. McDonald, US Intelligellce COlI/mIlnit)' Reform 
Studies Sitlce 1947 (Washington D.C.: Ccnter for the Study of 
Intelligence, April 2005.) 
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had been based on detailed knowledge only about intelligence 
gathered by his own agency. He was "neither expected nor 
permitted to learn more about the human sources from the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and satellite photographs from the National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency on which many judgments 
were based". In the new system, "no National Intelligence 
Estimate will be approved until each agency whose sources are 
being used as a basis for the findings articulates to all others 
its 'confidence in the source'." 172 
Within the CIA itself reform has focused on the analytical 
process within the Directorate of Intelligence, resulting for 
example in rhe formation of a so-called "Red Cell" fur 
unconventional and alternative analysis. There has also been a 
heavy emphasis on strengthening the CIA as first and foremost 
a HUMINT agency.!?] 
Both the remit of the new "Head of Analysis" in the British 
Cabinet Office, and in the United States the institution of 
some kind of "devil's advocate" function such as the CIA's 
"Red Cell", point to the need to institutionalise challenges to 
what has variously been called "group think", "prevailing 
wisdom", or "the mindset". In the growing field of 
intelligence studies, the contest between intelligence and 
prevailing wisdom is seen as a permanent problem. The end 
product of intelligence, whether it is called "assessments", 
"judgements", or "estimates", is just what it says it is, and no 
more than that. As Lawrence Freedman has written: 
The advantage of intelligence as a promotional device 
lies in the authority derived from a secretive process 
that supposedly can draw on special and increasingly 
intrusive sources of information that cannot be 
revealed lest they be closed off by the targets. Yet the 
inherent uncertainties and ambiguities of the process by 
172 Dough.:, ]ehl, "Top Spy's No. 2 Tells of Changes ro Avoid Error", New 
York Times, 191uly 2005. 
173 Private information. 
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which this information is turned into assessments for 
policy purposes can never be an exact science or 
immune to political and institutional bias. 174 
The changes currently being instituted in botb the British and 
American intelligence communities should go some way 
towards improving tbe quality of their judgements and 
assessments. But that still does not solve the problem inherent 
at the next crossroads - the intelligence/policy interface. As 
the New York Times put it in a recent editorial, with reference 
to the changes instituted by the DNI and described as above in 
General Hayden's testimony, 
... none of Mr. Negroponre's changes can prevent the 
White House from selectively using intelligence to 
justify bad policy decisions. Washington has so far 
been willing to look at failures in intelligence reporting 
leading up to the war in Iraq, but has consistently shied 
away from the more delicate issue of how political 
leaders used those reports. The intelligence failures on 
Iraq will not be fully understood, and the right lessons 
learned, until Congress insists on a thorough 
investigation of what happened after those faulty 
reports left the analysts' offices and went to the policy 
makers. 175 
In actual fact, therefore, the field will always be open for 
policy-makers to interpret the product according to their Own 
experience, views, knowledge, and indeed their own 
prejudices. The literature on intelligence failures is replete with 
examples. In the case of Iraq, however, the "received wisdom" 
seems to have permeated not only the policy-makers, the 
media, and public opinion, but the intelligence community as 
well. For someone in the intelligence agencies then to stand up 
and suggest that the absence of really "hard" intelligence 
perhaps meant that there were no WMD in Iraq would, as 
suggested by someone close to SIS, be tantamount to rushing 
out into the middle of a crowded three-lane highway to try to 
174 Lawrence Freedman, "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat", Sun1ivai, va!. 
46, no. 2 (2004): 36. 
-175 New York Times, editorial, 1 August 2005. 
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stop the traffic. Some did try to raise some questions, as we 
have seen. In the VK, for example, a section chief in the 
Defence Intelligence Staff, who had been away on leave until 
18 September, did question the intelligence basis for the 45 
minute claim, as well as the intelligence behind the judgement 
on Iraqi production and possession of chemical agents. On the 
latter point he wrote: "We have not seen intelligence which we 
believe 'shows' that Iraq has continued to produce CW agent 
in 1998-2002, although our judgement is that it has probably 
done so." 176 But "group think" prevailed. 
176' RCl'iew of Jlltelligence 011 \Y/ca/Jolls or Mass Destructio11 ... , para. 666-
678. 
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Chapter 5 
Return to inspections 
By late 1998, the consensus in the United Nations Security 
Council disarmament inspections regime had been 
considerably weakened. For some time, the Russians, French 
and Chinese had been of the opinion that the United Nations 
disarmament regime ought to move from the stage of 
continued investigation of any remaining unsolved 
disarmament issues and exclusively focus on monitoring to 
ensure Iraq did not reconstitute proscribed weapons 
capabilities. However, the United States and Britain 
maintained that the disarmament investigations should 
continue until United Nations inspectors had fully verified 
Iraq's complete WMD disarmament, as required by Security 
Council Resolution 687. Iraq had undertaken a long-standing 
effort to discredit UNSCOM, and had also been seeking to 
"persuade" Security Council members to ease sanctions 
through economic incentives. Further, there was growing 
opposition to economic sanctions in a number of countries 
due to their impact on the Iraqi civilian population. This 
gradually undermined the Security Council's consensus on 
sanctions and the disarmament regime in Iraq. After 
Operation Desert Fox, undertaken by Britain and the United 
States in December 1998, the fragile Security Council 
consensus that had underpinned the disarmament regime 
broke down. United Nations inspections were not 
subsequently resumed, with the result that a number of 
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unresolved disarmament issues remained and the monitoring 
of Iraq's compliance with the disarmament objectives of 
Resolution 687 ceased. 
A number of serious allegations emerged regarding the 
relationship between UNSCOM inspectors, UNSCOM itself 
and some national intelligence services, most notably, those of 
the USA, Britain and Israel. In January 1999, the Washington 
Post launched a story that furtber discredited UNSCOM and 
its legacy. According to this article, certain UNSCOM 
inspectors had collected "eavesdropping evidence used in 
American efforts to undermine the Iraqi regime" .177 
Moreover, in February the same newspaper wrote that, 
unknown to UNSCOM itself, the United States had been 
infiltrating agents and espionage equipment into the 
organization since 1995 to obtain information about the Iraqi 
military.l78 To what extent this was actually unknown to the 
various members of UNSCOM remains unclear. It was 
subsequently reported that information collected in this 
manner had been used to select targets for Operation Desert 
Fox. This information undermined UNSCOM's credibility and 
was seen by many to require a new inspection agency that was 
untainted by such serious allegations. 
In February 1999 two panels were set up - one to study the 
issues relating to Iraq's WMD developments, the other IQ 
review the humanitarian situation in the country. A Brazilian 
diplomat, Celso Amorim, waS appointed to chair both panels 
and a third one focusing on the issue of Kuwait. The Amorim 
report on the situation as regards Iraq's WMD was dated 27 
March 1999. Its point of departure Was the following: 
that UNSCOM's and IAEA's current inability to 
implement their mandates in Iraq renders them unable 
to provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance 
177 Barton GcHman, ... Annan Suspicious of UNSeOM Role: UN Official 
Believes Evidence Shows Inspectors Hdpcd US Eavesdrop on Iraq", 
Washington Post, 6 January 1999; Colum Lynch, "US used UN to spy 
on Iraq, Aides Say", Bostoll Globe, 6 January 1999. 
178 Barton Gellman, '"'V.S. spying on Iraq via V.N.", \Vashillgtoll Post, 2 
March 1999. 
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with its obligations under Security Council resolutions 
and that it is essential that inspection teams return to 
Iraq as soon as possible. The current absence of 
inspectors has exponentially increased the risk of 
compromising the level of assurance already achieved, 
since it is widely recognized that the re-establishment of 
the baseline will be a difficult task. ( .... ) The panel 
considers that the status quo is not a practical 
alternative and recommends that efforts be made with 
a view [Q restoring an international inspection regime 
in Iraq that is effective, rigorous and credible. 179 
The regime proposed by the Amorim panel was thus a 
reinforced version of something foreshadowed in previous 
Security Council resolutions, namely an Hongoing monitoring 
and verification" (OMV) regime that would be both 
comprehensive and intrusive. However, the Security Council 
was subsequently divided on the issue of whether 
disarmament investigations should continue as under 
UNSCOM or if future inspections should focus primarily on 
monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq did not resume 
WMD programmes. 
On 17 December 1999, almost exactly one year after 
Operation Desert Fox, Security Council Resolution 1284 was 
passed with abstentions from Russia, China, France and 
Malaysia. This resolution established the Unired Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC) as UNSCOM's successor organization. This 
resolution specified UNMOVIC's mandate in accordance with 
the recommendations of the Amorim reports, i.e. reinforced 
monitoring and verification to ascertain whether Iraq was 
rebuilding proscribed capabilities and the resolution of 
disarmament tasks. The resolution required that UNMOVIC 
and IAEA would draw up a work programme in which key 
remaining disarmament tasks would be identified. This 
suggests that under Resolution 1284, the UN inspection 
agencies were given more discretion in designing the 
disarmament verification process than was the case with 
179 United Nations Security Council, document 5/1999/356, 27 r.,.'larch 
1999. 
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UNSCOM and IAEA between 1991 and 1998. In contrast, 
Resolution 687 in 1991 specified that UNSCOM's mandate 
was to ascertain whether Iraq was complying with the 
requirement to destroy all proscribed weapons, materials and 
infrastructures. However, Resolution 1284 required the key 
disarmament tasks defined by the inspection agencies to be 
approved by the Security Council. 
Resolution 1284 built on Security Council resolutions 
passed since 1990 and was not intended to signal a radical 
new trajectory in the United Nation's dealings with Iraq and 
the issue of WMD disarmament. However, significant changes 
in the incentives offered to Iraq, and in the UN's auditing of 
Iraqi cooperation ami compliance with the disarmament 
objectives, did nonetheless result from this resolution. In 
1991, Resolution 687 stated that the sanctions would remain 
until Iraq had complied with the disarmament objectives. But 
because the Security Council never reached the conclusion that 
Iraq had fully complied with Resolution 687, the sanctions 
were kept in place. Resolution 1284 effected significant 
changes for the prospect of lifting the economic sanctions 
imposed on Iraq by making it clear that the lifting of sanctions 
no longer depended on full Iraqi compliance with Resolution 
687. Instead, Resolution 1284 enabled the Security Council to 
suspend sanctions (in renewable blocks of four months) if Iraq 
fully cooperated with UNMOVIC's efforts to verify Iraqi 
disarmament and if the proscribed weapons capabilities were 
not subsequently reconstituted. ISO Resolution 1284 also made 
it clear that this suspension would be reviewed during the first 
year after the resolution was passed, if Iraq cooperated in this 
manner. 
The task of monitoring and verifying whether Iraq was 
rebuilding proscribed weapons capabilities was emphasized in 
the naming of the new agency and in the actual text of 
Resolution 1284. The objective of resolving "remaining key 
disarmament" tasks signaled a move away from the nlore 
180 Jlatricia Lcwis, "From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC: The United Nations 
and Iraq", Disannament Fortl11l, no. 2 (United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research, 2001): 65. 
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widely encompassing demand of complete WMD 
disarmament in Resolution 687. The shift towards a more 
limited disarmament task appeared to open up an opportunity 
to circumvent the difficulties that had arisen ftom UNSCOM's 
efforts to account for Iraq's complete \XlMD disarmament. 
The requirement that UNMOVIC would draw up a plan 
specifying these key remaining disarmament tasks within 60 
days after its creation suggested that the following round of 
UN disarmament verification was intended to be a process 
with a clear end point. However, in 1997-98, the Security 
Council's requirement that UNSCOM and Iraq focus on 
resolving key disarmament tasks had failed to resolve the 
emerging "deadlock". Despite these changes, Iraq JiJ not 
accept Resolution 1284. The Iraqi regime argued that all 
prohibited weapons had been destroyed, that there was 
accordingly no role for United Nations weapons inspectors in 
Iraq and that the Security Council should therefore lift 
sanctions. IS 1 As a result, the sanctions were kept in place and 
UNMOVIC was unable to enter Iraq to pursue monitoring 
and verification. 
When UNSC Resolution 1284 was passed, many countries 
wanted to introduce a new United Nations inspection agency 
with a different, i.e. less confrontational, approach to dealing 
with Iraq than that of UNSCOM. Both the lA EA (especially in 
1991) and UNSCOM experienced a number of 
confrontational inspections during the seven years they were 
in Iraq, even though the majority of inspections had not been 
confrontational. This revealed how politicized the inspection 
regime had become during the years of UNSCOM's presence 
in Iraq. It also demonstrated that a number of political actors 
were seeking to define how the new inspection agency should 
carry our its task, although this was supposed to be a technical 
disarmament "accounting" and monitoring effort. The desire 
that UNMOVIC should be designed to be less 
"confrontational" than UNSCOM probably resulted from the 
181 Hans Blix, "The Role ot Inspection as a Part of the Effort to Prevent the 
Possession of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction", lecture at the fourth 
training cnurse for future staff of UNMOVIC, Ottawa, 28 May 2001. 
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confrontations and frustrations that had emerged between 
Iraq, UNSCOM and the UNSC in 1997-98. This was also 
reflected in the specification of UNMOVIC's mandate and in 
the incentives offered to Iraq to cooperate and comply with 
the inspection process. 
From the outset, UNMOVICs mandate and organizational 
features were designed to be different from UNSCOM. For 
example, Resolution 1284 specified that UNMOVIC staff 
should be employed by the United Nations and be recruited 
through the organization's normal recruitment procedures. 
This meant that UNMOVIC's staff had to declare loyalty to 
the United Nations as part of their employment conditions. 
This was probably a reaction to previous scandals over alleged 
links between UNSCOM staff and national intelligence 
agencies, and intended as a "preventive" defence against Iraqi 
(or other) acclIsations that UNMOVIC inspectors were agents 
of national governments. Whether such a measllre can 
effectively safeguard against dialogue between national 
intelligence services and UNMOVIC inspectors from their 
own countries is, of course, debatable. 
The neW recruitment policy also required an even 
geographical spread among UNMOVIC employees. In 
contrast, UNSCOM's recruitment efforts had focused 
exclusively on expertise. UNSCOM's staff were forwarded by 
national governments in response to specific requests from 
UNSCOM stating which skills and expertise the organization 
required.182 These experts tended to come from countries that 
had chemical or biological weapons programmes in the past, 
and which were willing to "publicize" this expertise by 
offering it to UNSCOM. NATO countries were thus over-
represented among the weapons inspectors. In some respects, 
the attempt by Resolution 1284 to reduce the predominance 
of NATO countries and the US and the UK in particular in the 
United Nations weapon inspector cadre appears to have had 
unintended effects on the "sum tota]" of UNMOVIC's 
expertise. Several former inspectors have since argued that this 
182 Braut-Hcgghammcr, "Disarming Iraq? ... " 
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recruitment policy limited the number of UNMOVIC 
employees who had useful operational experience or were 
familiar with information gathering and assessment. 183 
Between 1999 and October 2002, UNMOVIC undertook a 
variety of preparatory tasks in response to the requests in 
Resolution 1284, while waiting for Iraq to permit its 
inspectors to enter the country. UNMOVIC staff sought to 
develop new monitoring and verification procedures and 
identify an inventory from which "key remaining 
disarmament tasks" could be identified. This inventory 
consisted of a wide range of disarmament issues remaining 
from the period between 1991 and 1998 and suggestions on 
what Iraq had to do in order to settle these unresolved 
issues. 184 A number of these points stemmed from the 
objective to achieve complete accounting of Iraq's proscribed 
programmes, production, consumption and destruction. As a 
result, the inventory tended not to specify whether there was 
a risk that the listed weapons, agents and precursors could still 
be effective as weapons. 
As UNMOVIC did not receive information from Iraq and 
was unable to carry out inspections, the organization sought 
to acquire information from member states (i.e. national 
intelligence) and from open sources.185 UNSCOM material 
and archives were also reassessed. While UNMOVIC in some 
respects had a "corporate memory" that was uniquely able to 
assess incoming information about developments in Iraq, they 
lacked the on-the-ground access that had enabled UNSCOM 
to become the best source of information and analysis on the 
issue of Iraqi WMD and disarmament. 
In 2000, UNMOVIC reviewed the lists of items and 
materials whose import and export had to be reported by the 
exporting country and Iraq. This system, usually referred to as 
the "export/import mechanism", had existed since 1996 to 
183 Inccrviews with several UNMOVIC inspectors in New York , March 
2004. 
184 UNMOVIC t\vdfrh quarterly repon (2003), (5/2003/232) (UNMOVIC 
[online 26 Aug 2005]). 
185 UNMOVIC tendl quarterly report (2002), (S/2(02/981) (UNMOVIC 
[online 26 Aug 2005]). 
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ensure that items suitable for proscribed and legitimate 
activities ("dual-use") were only used for permitted purposes. 
Further, a training programme for future UNMOVIC 
inspectors was established and implemented so that a number 
of inspectors could be available if Saddam Hussein permitted 
UNMOVIC to commence work in lraq.186 
UNMOVIC in action 
With the passing of Resolution 1441 on 7 November 2002, it 
seemed certain that UNMOVIC would have to leave behind 
its calm existence in the United Nations building in New 
York, and go into the field to investigate whether Iraq was 
truly disarmed of WMD. The text of the resolution stated that 
it was an attempt to offer Iraq "a final opportunity to comply 
with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of 
the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced 
inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified 
completion the disarmament process established by resolution 
687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council".1 87 
Thus, it also seemed certain that Iraq would face a different 
degree of pressure in the upcoming inspections than it had in 
the past. Moreover, the Security Council resolution identified 
"Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolntions and 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-ran~e 
missiles" as a threat to international peace and security.18 
Resolution 1441 stated that the United Nations weapons 
inspectors task was to full)' verify the completion of the WMD 
disarmament process established by resolution 687 in 1991 
(emphasis added).189 In essence, UNMOVIC and IAEA's task 
became to quickly establish whether Iraq still retained or was 
developing proscribed weapons, components or capabilities. 
Pursuant to Resolution 1441, the issue that had to be 
186 UNMOVIC first quarterly report (2000), (S/20001516) (UN1vl0VlC 
[online 26 Aug 2005]). 
187 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (1002), (5/2002/1198) 
(United States Mission to the United Nations [onlinc 16 Aug 2005]). 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
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determined based on UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections Was 
whether Iraq had disarmed of proscribed weapons and 
capabilities, and what conclusions could be drawn about Iraqi 
intentions in the area of WMD based on the level of its 
cooperation with the United Nations inspections. 
The resolution described the new inspection system as 
enhanced, and redefined and added powers to the inspectors. 
Moreover, in order to fulfill the task required by Security 
Council Resolution 1441 UNMOVIC's capabilities and 
reSources became considerably more extensive than the 
organization had ori8inally been established to undertake (and had prepared for).!9 The inspections had to start within a 45-
day deadline following the date of the adoption of the 
resolution. Furthermore, Iraq had to provide the United 
Nations with a complete declaration of its proscribed weapons 
programmes as well as non-proscribed activities since late 
1998 in the chemical, biological and nuclear areas. On 13 
November, Iraq accepted Resolution 1441 and welcomed the 
return of United Nations inspectors.!9! UNMOVIC's first 
inspection in Iraq took place on 27 November. 
Only a few days later, on 7 December, Iraq provided the 
above-mentioned declaration, which turned out to be 12,000 
pages lonw, to the UN inspection agencies and the Security 
Council.! 2 However, once this declaration had been assessed 
UNMOVIC and several countries interpreted it as an 
indication that Iraq had failed to comply fully with the 
requirements placed upon it by the United Nations in 
Resolution 1441. The declaration contained very little new 
information about the proscribed WMD programmes, and it 
was discovered that the declaration in some cases omitted 
information that had previously been submitted to the United 
Nations. However, Iraq did admit to having new ballistic 
missile projects having taken place since 1998. This was seen 
as demonstrating an uneven level of Iraqi cooperation, 
190 UNMOVIC twelfth quarterly report. 
191 UNlvIOVIC eleventh quarterly report (2002), ($/200211303) 
(UNMOVIC [online 26 Aug 2005J). 
192 UNMOVIC twelfth quarterly reporr. 
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characterized by a mixture of proactive cooperation and 
examples of the contrary - for example, in some cases failing 
to provide information t,hat it had previously submitted to 
UNSCOM inspectors.19o 
It was clear from the outset that with a large US military 
presence in the region, whose performance would suffer if the 
troops were deployed later than in the early spring because of 
the intense heat of the Iraqi summer, America would not be 
willing to countenance a lengthy inspection process. In this 
context, UNMOVIC's assessment of the level of Ira~i 
cooperation would thus be crucial from the outset.1 4 
However, the scope and extent of Iraq's cooperation was 
difficult to assess. A number of commentators made the point 
that it would be difficult for Iraq to prove that proscribed 
weapons and capabilities did 110t exist. The well-known 
history of Iraqi deception and denial efforts meant that 
UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection results would always be 
viewed with some skepticism as the Iraqis might succeed in 
concealing significant disarmament issues from the inspectors. 
To enable the UN inspectors to assess Iraqi compliance, 
UNMOVIC's chairman Hans Blix developed an analytical 
distinction between Iraqi cooperation on "process" (i.e. 
facilitating the inspectors' work) and "substance" (declaring 
all relevant information and helping the inspectors to retrieve 
the necessary information).195 However, it would be difficult 
to assess and measure the extent of Iraq's cooperation in 
"substance" as a purely technical question. Ultimately, the 
Security Council would decide whether or not Iraq had 
complied with Resolution 1441. However, the "benchmark" 
of full cooperation applied by the individual Security Council 
members was inherently difficult to define, and probably 
varied from country to country. 
193 Dueifer, C011lprrbcllsim.' Report ... , vo!. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent'" p. 
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The context in which the United Nations agencies were 
sent to Iraq made it difficult to insist that the purpose of the 
inspection agencies was purely technical. Because of the 
considerable pressure On the inspectors to establish whether or 
not Iraq was complying with its WMD disarmament 
obligations, once the inspections started the focus of the media 
quickly turned to whether or not "smoking guns" - i.e. 
proscribed weapons and capabilities - had been found. This 
tendency was strengthened when Blix and IAEA's director 
Mohamed EIBaradei said at press conferences that "no 
smoking guns" had been found during the inspections. This 
dynamic ultimately created a skewed image of what the 
UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections were seeking to achieve, 
their focus, and what they could in fact achieve. 
The unique value of the United Nations inspections was 
not that they could discover "smoking guns", but that they 
might identify whether or not systematic efforts to develop 
proscribed WMD ptoduction capabilities took place in Iraq. 
For example, UNSCOM's uncovering of Iraq's biological 
warfare programme in July 1995 had resulted from 
meticulous investigations, interviews and discovering 
anomalies in Iraqi declarations. As the focus shifted towards 
detecting the infamous "smoking gun", the low probability 
that UNMOVIC or IAEA inspectors would discover these 
became an easy target for the United States administration. 
The focus on the search for "smoking guns" ultimately 
resulted in an "either/or" view of what the inspections could 
achieve in Iraq. 
During the inspection process, it was widely held that the 
level of Iraq's cooperation was influenced by the US military 
presence in the region and the way in which the United States 
and the Security Council members commented on Iraqi 
cooperation with the UN inspectors. An initial problem was 
Iraq's Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration 
(CAFCD), submitted on 7 December 2002, which was 
criticized as it was possible to identify omissions in Iraq's 
description of past proscribed programmes, capabilities and 
past production of chemical and biological agents. Further, 
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Iraq did not provide information about the origins of its 
clandestine purchases of ballistic missile-related materials on 
the international black market, and did not respond to 
allegations from the United Kingdom and the US regarding 
uranium purchases and aluminium tubes. Blix reported to the 
Security Council on 27 January 2003 that "Iraq appears not 
to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the 
disarmament which was demanded of it." 196 
At the same time, Iraq did declare a number of important 
items, including equipment that had been destroyed under 
UNSCOM inspections. Since late 1998 Iraq had managed to 
reassemble some of these items. In 2003, Iraq initiated efforts 
in a number of areas that signaled more pro active cooperation 
with inspectors. In late January, an Iraqi commission was set 
up that would search for any remaining proscribed items. This 
commission located four empty chemical munitions, two BW 
aerial bombs and associated components.197 A second Iraqi 
commission was established to locate relevant documents, and 
this commission reported that it had found documents 
concerning Iraq's unilateral destruction of proscribed 
items. 19S In mid-January, Iraq finally passed a presidential 
decree that went some way towards fulfilling a requirement 
UNSCOM had made as early as 1991, namely that Iraq 
should enact a law forbidding anyone in Iraq from engaging in 
efforts related to WMD.1 99 However, the Iraqi decree only 
prohibited Iraqi citizens and companies from undertaking 
such activities, and failed to mention governmental agencies, 
organizations and officials. 200 At the time, therefore, many 
saw this as an attempt to comply with the requirement on the 
surface whilst retaining a "scope" in which illegal action could 
be undertaken. 
196 Bib.::, Briding to the Security Council 27 January 2003. 
197 UNMOVIC twelfth quarterly report. 
198 Ibid. 
199 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 71 S (1991) (United 
Nations [online 21 Aug 2005]). 
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During these inspections, the failure to find WMD 
stockpiles or programmes did not in itself convince the outside 
world that no such weapons existed. It was still fresh in their 
memory that during the previous round of inspections it had 
taken several years to uncover prohibited weapons 
programmes and proscribed items. Of course, finding evidence 
to prove that something does not exist in a country the size of 
Iraq is very difficult. Hans Blix has later admitted that, at the 
time, only solid evidence would have convinced him and 
others that no prohibited weapons existed in Iraq. He wrote: 
" ... few were impressed by Iraq's argument [ ... ] that it should 
be presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Who would attach 
a presumption of innocence to the regime uf Saddam 
Hussein?,,201 
On 5 February, the American Secretary of State addressed 
the United Nations Security Council, stating that Iraq was in 
defiance of Security Council Resolution 1441 as well as 
previous resolutions.20l Colin Powell's main conclusion was 
that Iraq was in material breach of United Nation resolutions, 
and that the inspections would not be able to detect Iraq's 
WMD efforts. PoweIl said that Saddam Hussein's intentions 
remained unchanged, that "Saddam Hussein and his regime 
have made no effort, no effort, to disarm ... " but were 
"concealing their efforts to produce morc weapons of mass 
destruction". He also said that "inspectors can look all they 
want and they will find nothing ... this is part and parcel of a 
policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years.,,203 
Subsequently, Iraqi efforts to cooperate with the 
inspections appeared to intensify rapidly. Iraq proposed a 
number of new methods and approaches to resolve unresolved 
disarmament issues. Some of the main difficulties in trying to 
settle these issues once and for all resulted from the absence of 
scientific methods that could quantitatively verify how much 
201 Hans Blix. Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass 
Destruction {London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 20(4), p. 112. 
202 Cotin L. Powcll, "Remarks to the United Nations Security Council", 
New York City: 5 February 2003 (U.s. Deparnnenr of State lonlinc 5 
Sop 2005]1. 
203 Ibid. 
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chemical and biological agents Iraq had secretly destroyed in 
1991. However, UNMOVIC experts did not think the 
methods sugfjested by the Iraqis would enable them to resolve 
these issues.-04 Overall, many saw the Iraqi cooperative 
efforts as "too little, too late", and these were widely 
interpreted as a consequence of the build-up of us forces.20s 
In his final report to the Security Council, Or Blix stated that 
" ... the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for has not 
been shortened by inspections or Iraqi declarations, 
explanations or documentation".206 UNMOVIC reported that 
these untesolved disarmament issues, identified in the Amorim 
report and in UNSCOM's final report circulated in the 
Security Council in January 1999, remained unresolved -
mainly because Iraq had not provided supporting evidence.207 
Referring to Iraq's recent initiatives, Or Blix went on to say: 
"It is hard to understand why a number of the measures, 
which are now being taken, could not have been initiated 
earlier. If they had been taken earlier, they might have borne 
fruit by now" .20S 
When submitting the quarterly report to the UN in late 
February 2003, Blix said that with the exception of the AI-
Samoud 2 missiles that could reach proscribed ranges, "the 
Commission has not at any time during the inspections in Iraq 
found eviuence of the continuation ur resumption of 
programmes of weapons of mass destruction or significant 
quantities of proscribed items - whether from pre-1991 or 
later". In early June 2003 Or Blix elaborated on the 
difficulties in drawing conclusions about Iraqi capabilities 
from the previous round of inspections. Referring to the 
"failure" to find proscribed weapons caches or capabilities, he 
said that "this does not necessarily mean that such items could 
not exist. They might - there remain long lists of items 
204 UNMOVIC twelfth quarterly report, p. 13. 
205 Gcoffrcy Fordcn, "Intention to deceive ... " 
206 Hans BHx, Briefing of the Security Council,S June 2003: Oral 
introduction of the 13th quarterly repOrt of UNMOVIC (UNMOVIC 
[alllinc.26 Aug 20051). 
207 UNMOVIC twelfth quarterly report. 
208 Ibid, p. 13. 
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unaccounted for - but it is not justified to jump to the 
conclusion that something exists just because it is unaccounted 
for" .209 
Throughout the inspection period, between 27 November 
and 18 March, suspicions centered on the scope of Iraq's 
cooperation, and why this seemed to increase as the US-led 
coalition's forces were being built-up in the region. There are 
still no final answers why Sad dam Hussein decided to embark 
upon the particular cooperation strategy demonstrated by Iraq 
during the inspections. Some Iraqi concealment efforts, 
undertaken to prevent the inspectors from detecting 
col11Jel1tiol1ai weapons and equipment illegally purchased from 
firms in Russia, Bclarus and the former republic of 
Yugoslavia, fuelled suspicions that Iraq was still deceiving the 
United Nations about its WMD.210 While UNMOVIC and 
lA EA inspectors were in the country, Iraq also engaged in 
activities to safeguard information concerning the regime's 
security and details about Saddam Hussein's whereabouts. 
These activities included surveillance in and around sensitive 
sites. For intelligence services, it would clearly be difficult to 
distinguish Iraqi security-related measures from WMD 
concealment activities.211 Suspicious Iraqi behaviour tended 
to be seen as a continuation of the deception and denial efforts 
Iraq had engaged in during 1991-98. 
Behind the scene in Baghdad 
Based on the ISG report it is possible to point to some of the 
developments, dynamics and perceptions in the Iraqi regime 
prior to and during UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections. While 
Iraq was preparing for the inspections to resume, the regime 
was struggling to define the scope of cooperation with the 
inspectors and produce a written declaration to the United 
Nations seeking to prove a negative - that no WMD 
stockpiles remained and that the nuclear, chemical and 
209 Blix, Briefing of the Security Council, 5 June 2003. 
210 Duelfer, COlllfJrehenslIJe Report ... , \'01. I, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
64. 
211 Ibid. 
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biological weapons programmes had not been resumed. It 
appears that by that stage it was clear to many regime officials 
that they could face war unless the inspections went well. 
Moreover, Resolution 1441 declared Iraq as being in material 
breach of United Nations resolutions from the outset. 
After Resolution 1441 was passed, the Iraqi "Higher 
Committee", a body that had managed Iraq's relations with 
United Nations weapons inspectors in the past, was re-
established in preparation for the upcoming round of 
inspections. Between 1991 and 1998 this committee was led 
by Tariq Aziz, although it was heavily influenced by Hussein 
Kamel prior to his defection in 1995. The struggles between 
these two individuals, who appear to have had opposing views 
on the extent to which Iraq should cooperate with the 
inspectors, shaped Iraq's seemingly confusing policy during 
those years.212 In 2002, however, Iraqi Vice-President Taha 
Yasin Ramadan became the new leader of the Higher 
Committee. The ISG reported that Ramadan found it difficult 
to assess how much authority he could exercise in this role 
with regard to facilitating th~ inspections.213 The extent and 
details of Iraqi cooperation was "negotiated" in meetings with 
UNMOVIC and IAEA before they entered Iraq and during the 
inspections. 
During the preparations, and in the early stages of the 
inspections (November and December 2002), the scope of 
Iraq's cooperation with the inspection agencies appears to 
have been subject to disagreement within the Iraqi regime. The 
ISG report suggests that from the outset, Saddam Hussein was 
more reluctant to cooperate fully with the inspectors than 
other top regime officials. For example, soon after Resolution 
1441 was passed the Iraqi President told the Revolutionary 
Command Council that the United Nations would not be 
allowed to undertake "reconnaissance flights, interviews with 
scientists, or visits to presidential sites" in the next round of 
212 Duelfcr, Comprchensive Report ... , vol. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
14. 
213 Duclfcr, Comprehellsh'e Report ... , vol. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
10. 
inspections, in spite of Resolution 1441 demanding full Iraqi 
cooperation.214 Vice-President Ramadan reportedly tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade Saddam Hussein to allow 
interviews with Iraqi scientists. When the situation later 
became more pressing, Ramadan authorized United Nations 
overflights and allowed the inspectors to conduct interviews 
with scientists.215 This kind of initiative, countering previous 
statements by the President, was practically unheard of in Iraq 
and illustrates how seriously Iraqi regime officials viewed the 
situation. However, the Higher Committee's more conciliatory 
approach to cooperation with the inspectors resulted in 
Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay Hussein, serving as a committee 
"watchdog" to ensure that they would not make further 
concessions without his approval.216 Saddam Hussein seemed 
to come to the conclusion that a surge of cooperation with the 
inspectors could result in the lifting of sanctions and avoid 
war.21 ? Hence the Iraqi President turned out to be more 
accommodating towards the weapons inspectors than he had 
signa led in his earlier statements. For example, in December 
2002, Saddam Hussein instructed military leaders to 
cooperate completely with the United Nations inspectors.218 
Resolution 1441 requested that Iraq would submit, within 
one month, "a currently accurate, full and complete 
declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, 
and other delivery systems", "including any holdings and 
precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-
components, stocks of agents, and related material and 
equipment, the locations and work of its research, 
development and production facilities, as well as all other 
chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, including any 
which it claims are for purfoses not related to weapon 
production or material" .21 This was an enormous task, 
214 'hid., p. 16. 
115 Ibid., p. 16. 
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particularly considering that Iraq had to account for all 
aspects of proscribed programmes as well as other civilian 
developments that could potentially be applied to prohibited 
activities. However, the sections of the declaration concerning 
Iraq's accounting for previous proscribed programmes could 
be (and was) largely based on previous declarations and 
documents submitted to the United Nations between 1991-
98. 
This "currently accurate, full and complete declaration" 
(CAFCD) was written at the Iraqi National Monitoring 
Directorate. Those working with this document experienced 
immense pressure, partly because of the enormous task and 
the short deadline, and because they had to successfully 
accommodate the wishes of the Iraqi regime and the United 
Nations in this declaration. On the one hand, the Security 
Council demanded that they should include all the 
information that was required by Security Council Resolution 
1441. On the other hand, it appears that the Iraqis wanted to 
formulate the declaration so that it did not focus on issues 
that the Iraqi regime (for various reasons) did not want to 
submit to UNMOVIC, IAEA and the Security Council. It was 
basically up to the teams at the Iraqi National Monitoring 
Directorate to get this balance right. 
While there is no complete understanding of the precise 
scope of Iraq's cooperation with UNMOVIC and IAEA 
between November 2002 and March 2003, some of the Iraq 
Survey Group's (ISG) findings suggest that assumptions and 
judgments about Iraqi actions and motivations in 2002-03 
need to be revisited. In particular, a number of Iraqi actions 
during this period appear to have been interpreted based on 
an expectation that Iraq would seek to minimize its 
cooperation to the lowest level it could get away with. One 
important example in this regard was the reaction to the 
CAFCD when it was submitted on 7 December 2002. At the 
time of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections, most countries, 
as well as UNMOVIC, considered the Iraqi declaration 
219 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 5/200211198 (1002) 
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disappointing, and as a lost opportunity for Iraq to come 
clean. Huwever, after the ISG's investigations it appears that 
the Iraqi declaration did not essentially misrepresent the 
overall picture with regards to NBC weapons or programmes 
between 1998 and 2003. 
One feature of Iraq's "political culture" was that in the 
absence of clear orders, individual perceptions of Saddam 
Hussein's intentions formed the basis for those making 
decisions for the regime, including those interacting with 
United Nations inspectors. Because Saddam Hussein's views 
were not always clearly stated, at times individuals had to act 
based on what they believed would be in accordance with his 
views. Various rumours appear to have circulated regarding 
what Saddam Hussein wanted. At times, it seems that these 
assumptions and rumours made it difficult for the Iraqi regime 
to change its policies rapidly and implement these changes 
down the bureaucratic and managerial chains. 
The ISG also found evidence of difficulties that the Iraqi 
regime faced when trying to increase cooperation with 
UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors. Some reported cases point 
to elements of "friction" within sectors of the Iraqi 
government and industries that obstructed rapid changes to 
the regime's policy of cooperation. For example, the ISG 
reported that some govcrnment employees in the Military 
Ind ustrial Commission initially did not believe that Saddam 
Hussein no longer wanted them to withhold information from 
inspectors. Therefore, in early 2003 the Iraqi Vice-President 
had to see the employees personally and ex~lain that this was 
indeed what Saddam Hussein had decided.-20 Similar 
problems in policy coordination were demonstrated by Iraqi 
governmental bureaucracies in the years prior to the 
inspections. Another example of internal "friction" can be 
found in the conflicting interests of the National Monitoring 
Directorate, responsible for ensuring compliance with Security 
Council resolutions, and the Military Industrial Commission, 
which focused on military and industrial reconstruction. These 
120 Duclfcr, Comprehensive Report ... , voJ. 1, "Regime Strategic Intent", p. 
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clashes led to an internal deception campaign undertaken by 
the Military Industrial Commission with the aim of hiding 
information about dual-capable resources within Iraq.221 The 
Iraqi bureaucracy was thus not necessarily entirely and 
uniformly coordinated, and at the lower levels of the regime 
conflicting bureaucratic interests could take decision-making 
in differing directions. Moreover, the need of individuals to 
ensure that they acted in accordance with Saddam Hussein's 
wishes (and thus cover their backs) appears to have led to 
difficulties in implementing policy changes across 
governmental and private sectors during the inspections. It 
appears that people seemed to find it safer to act based on 
what they knew had been Saddam Hussein's position in the 
past, which may have led to a conservative tendency in Iraqi 
bureaucracies and administrations involved in the inspections 
process. For example, in interviews following the fall of the 
Iraqi regime, former Vice-President Ramadan has described 
how factory managers refused inspectors entry in 2002-03, 
and he explained that this was a case of people acting on what 
they believed was Saddam Hussein's policy, and seeking to 
protect themselves, when in fact his policy had changed.222 
Another important element in understanding Iraqi 
responses during the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections 
concerns their "obsession" with security. This was true in 
relation to their attempts to safeguard details regarding 
national security and the safety of the Iraqi regime. To some 
extent, it is not surprising that a country would want to keep 
a close watch on foreign inspectors and safeguard information 
considered essential for national security. This is perhaps 
especially understandable in light of the espionage allegations 
that emerged in connection with the United Nations inspectors 
between 1991 and 1998. For example, fears that the 
inspectors would seek to obtain sensitive information abour 
Iraqi military capabilities and Saddam Hussein's whereabouts 
sbaped Iraqi behaviour during the inspections.223 Moreover, a 
number of denial and deception activities were conducted by 
221 Ibid., pp. 53-55. 
222 Ibid., p. 10. 
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the Iraqis to prevent the inspectors from discovering illegally 
imported conventional weapons. These activities included 
surveillance and other security measures in what the lragis 
defined as sensitive sites.224 
According to the ISG, even as late as 2002 there were some 
uncertainties as to whether Irag had fully disarmed of WMD 
in the Iraqi army. In its final report, the ISG states that "senior 
military officers and former Regime officials were uncertain 
about the existence of WMD during ... the lead up to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom".225 Moreover, the report concluded 
that Saddam Hussein had "surprised" Iraqi generals in 
December 2002 when he informed them that he had no 
WMD. According to Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein's so-called 
"boasting" had led many in the army to conclude that Iraq 
had in fact retained WMD capabilities.226 In late 2002 the 
Iraqi President also attempted to set the record straight to the 
higher levels of the regime, by telling the Revolutionary 
Command Council, the Baath National Command and the 
Ministerial Council that there were nO WMD in Iraq.227 It is 
possible that these alleged uncertainties reflect the degree of 
compartmenralization associated with the issue of WMD in 
the Iraqi regime. If there were doubts among Iraqi officials 
regarding wheter Iraq had fully disarmed of WMD, such 
doubts may have influenced some individuals in their dealings 
with inspectors in 2002-2004. 
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Chapter 6 
Endgame in the Security Council 
On 8 November 2002 the UN Security Council unanimously 
voted in favour of Resolution 1441. The fact that all -
including Syria - voted in favour, and none abstained, was 
seen as a major victory for multilateral diplomacy. But it had 
required seven weeks of hard bargaining, with France as the 
major stumbling block, and - like so many UN resolutions -
it bore the hallmarks of a compromise. The United States had 
originally wanted a resolution which would clear the way for 
the use of force - "all necessary means" in UN language -
against Iraq, once the new inspection regime - UNMOVIC -
had established that Saddam was still not cooperating fully 
aIll! openly with the Security Council's demands. Two other 
major players, The United Kingdom and France, were still of 
the opinion that a second Security Council debate, and a new 
UN resolution, was desirable (UK) or would be needed 
(France). 
According to Bob Woodward's account, it finally boiled 
down to a choice between two words in the text of the 
resolution. The Americans had by then accepted the principle 
of another debate and a new resolution, but on condition that 
Iraq should submit a detailed declaration to show that it had 
no WMD and had terminated all its programmes to develop 
such weapons. If Iraq submitted a false declaration, or 
demonstrated a general failure to cooperate with UNMOVIC, 
this would enable the Security Council to pronounce Sad dam 
"in material breach", and hence clear the way for action. The 
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French, who at this point emerged as a leading protagonist, 
insisted that or had to be replaced by and, meaning that they 
saw a "general failure to cooperate" by itself as too much of 
a "carte blanche" for military action. Behind the contest over 
words lay the choice between an American strategy aimed at 
regime change, and a French strategy to bring the issue back 
to that of WMD disarmament. The French won that battle, 
but at the cost of accepting military action as the ultimate 
outcome if disarmament by peaceful means should fail. 22S 
The lines were now in fact drawn. Russia and China, while 
amenable to a continuation of the demand that Iraq should 
disarm, were adamantly opposed to the use of armed force to 
enforce that demand, whether by collective UN action or by 
unilateral means. France wished for regime change in Iraq, but 
would only accept Saddam's removal by force as a last resort 
and with the backing of a Security Council resolution. Great 
Britain wanted regime change, and hoped for a Security 
Council resolution to authorise military action for that 
purpose, but might be ready to participate in a unilateral 
action if that became necessary. U.5. policy was now firmly set 
on the removal of Saddam's regime, and would go it alone if 
there was impasse in the Security Council. In between were 
the smaller members of the Council, which might or might not 
condone the use of armed furce if authorised by the Security 
Council, but" only after all diplomatic means had been 
exhausted", whatever that meant. 
On 7 December Iraq submitted a declaration of nearly 
twelve thousand pages, which it said demonstrated and 
proved that it had no weapons of mass destruction. However, 
both UNMOVIC and the leading members of the Security 
Council soon found the declaration wanting in several 
respects. On the other hand it was deemed to show that Iraq 
was now cooperating, so the second of the conditions insisted 
upon by France as clearing the way for action was considered 
228 Woodward, Plall olAttack, pp. 220-127. 
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still not fulfilled. UNMOVIC would therefore have to 
continue its work before the St:curity Council could pass 
another resolution. 
The role of France 
France had by this time assumed a leading position in the 
process, which makes it necessary to take a closer look at the 
French position. French diplomacy is not famous for its 
transparency. The public statements on behalf of the French 
government, during the weeks that followed Resolution 1441, 
were often ambiguous. As a later study of French policy by 
three Le MO/lde journalists saw it, the French thought the 
Americans after resolution 1441 would have to play the 
inspections card to the end. The Americans, on the other 
hand, found reason to believe that France would support the 
use of force if the inspections were inconclusive.229 On 9 
September, in a lengthy interview with Elaine Sciolino of the 
New York Times, Chirac had proposed that the new Security 
Council resolution should give Saddam Hussein a three-week 
deadline for admitting the inspectors "without restrictions or 
preconditions". If Saddam rejected the return of the 
inspectors, or hampered their work, a second resolution 
should be passed on whether to use military force. Chirac 
continued by saying that France would work on the drafting 
of such a second resolution; that the ultimate French stance 
would depend on the wording; and that France was not 
committed to providing combat troops.230 Already then the 
ambiguities were visible. In a radio interview with "France 
Inter" on 12 November, however, Foreign Minister 
Dominique de Villepin seemed clearer as he described the 
simple choice facing Saddam: either he had to accept the 
international order and agree to give up his WMD, in which 
case he would avoid a war. Or he could decide to retain those 
weapons and therefore try to hide them. "In that case he'll run 
229 Patrick Jarrcau, Sylvic Kauffmann and Corine Lesncs, "Paris-
Washington: Les dessous cl'lIne rupture"', Le Monde, 26 March 2003. 
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122 PORSVARSSTUDIER 412005 
the serious risk, face the certainty of seeing force used against 
him.,,231 That determination appeared reinforced as the 
French military on 20 December announced that the aircraft 
carrier Charles-de-Gaulle would be ready to sail at the end of 
January. On 7 January President Jacgues Chirac told the 
French military "to be ready for all eventualities". The day 
before, the French army chief-of-staff had stated that 
"everything suggests that the army will be highly mobilised in 
2003".232 
On 20 January came the first signals that the French 
position was hardening against military action in Irag. At a 
press briefing after a Security Council meeting, de Villepin 
categorically stated that "nothing today justifies military 
action". And when asked about the possibility of a French 
veto, he said "we shall go to the end". As the senior French 
commentator Pierre Hassner saw it at the time: 
On January 20, France cut itself off from its only 
interlocutor and ally at the heart of the Bush 
administration, Colin Powell, through its badly timed 
threat of a veto in the Security Council and its 
resounding 'no' to war. This change resulted from a 
Franco-German declaration that was made in the name 
of Europe, but without any consultation with their 
other European partners. Then there were France's 
barely credible proposals for the disarmament of 
Saddam Hussein by increasing the number of 
'3' inspectors. - .J 
The veto threat in reality played directly into the hands of the 
hawks in the Bush administration, providing grist for the mill 
of those who had all along deplored the UN road as futile and 
as a waste of time. Their case also appeared reinforced by 
231 Interview with M. Dominique de ViIlepin by France Inter radio, 11 
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UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix' report to the Security 
Council on 27 January, when he said that "Iraq appears not 
to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the 
disarmament that was demanded of it." On 5 February Colin 
Powell made a final attempt to convince the Security Council 
not only that Saddam Hussein had or was developing WMD 
- which most of the protagonists believed at the time, 
although his evidence has later been shown to be based on 
flawed intelligence - but also that there was an imminent 
threat which called for military action. With a passionate 
speech, de Villepin rejected the imminence of the threat, and 
asked that the inspectors be given more time. The problem 
with that was, as Pierre Hassncr wrote at the time, the lack of 
a time limit: "To give him lSaddam] a last chance was both 
legitimate and desirable. But in not linking rhat with a solemn 
final and relatively near date, this could only suggest to him 
that he had a chance to win by attrition, dragging the matter 
along until the summer and towards the U.S. election."Z34 
Britain in the lurch 
Between the determination of the Bush administration to go to 
war to eliminate the Saddam regime, and the growing 
determination of France to block that road, a compromise by 
this time appeared impossible. Still the British made a final 
attempt to formulate a Security Council resolution that could 
obtain a majority and avoid the threatened French veto. Why 
Britain did so can only be explained through a closer study of 
the British government's policy. The most thorough analyses 
that have come to light show that already by March 2002 
Britain's aim towards Iraq was "the reintegration of a law-
abiding Iraq, which does not possess WMD or threaten its 
neighbours, into the international commu,nity. Implicitly, this 
cannot occur with Saddam in power ... "Z05 In a meeting with 
President Bnsh at his Crawford ranch in April, according to a 
234 Hassncr, "Guerrc: qui fait le jeu de qui?" 
235 Christoph Blurh, "The British Road to War: BIalr, Bush and the decision 
to invade Iraq", I11tematiOlwl Affairs, vo!. 80, no. 5 (1004): 871-891. 
The quotation is from the Butler report, para. 265. 
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UK Cabinet Paper, Prime Minister Tony Blair apparently 
"said that the UK would support military action to bring 
about regime change, provided that certain conditions were 
met: efforts had been made to construct a coalirion/shape 
public opinion, the Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and 
the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the 
UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted".136 The British 
were, however, clearly concerned that the military planning in 
the United States "Iacks a political framework. In particular, 
little thought has been given to creating the political 
conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to 
shape it ... A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a 
protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already 
made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this 
point. ,,237 
In the meantime, until an international consensus could be 
reached on military action, Britain would continue to support 
the policy of containment. But the thinking in Whitehall was 
that even if Saddam, faced with the threat of the use of 
massive force by the US, should re-admit the inspectors, he 
would continue to obstruct them and play for time. 
Inspections would therefore not suffice fully to disarm 
Saddam. Moreover, Blair and other members of his cabinet 
also considered containn1ent as wrong in itself, since it did not 
and would not prevent Saddam from continuing his massive 
abuse of human rights against his own people. The Iraqi 
regime's response to containment had been to shift the burden 
onto the Iraqi population. 
On 23 July 2002, accordin~ ~o a recently leaked and 
evidently authentic document,-38 Tony Blair held a high-level 
meeting at No. 10 Downing Street to review Britain's options, 
evidently based on the Cabinet Paper referred to above. It was 
then evident that the US had decided on a military solution to 
236 "Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action'\ Stmday Times, 
12 June 2005 JOnlinc 23 June 2005], para. 2. 
237 Ibid., para. 1 and 19. 
238 The document \vas published in full in the SIll/day 1i'mes 1 May 2005 
under the heading "The secret Downing Street memo". 
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the problem of Iraq, although the timing was not yet fixed. 
Britain was in agreement with the US that regime change was 
the only solution. But the Attorney General at the meeting 
made it clear that "the desire for regime change was not a 
legal base for military action. There were three possible legal 
bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC 
authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in 
this case." The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, agreed that "the 
case [for unilateral military action] was thin. Saddam was not 
threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less 
than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran." His advice was 
therefore to work lip a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to 
allow the UN weapons inspectors back in. 
Tony Blair, summing up the discussion thus far, stated that 
regime change and WMD "were linked in the sense that it was 
the regime that was producing the WMD". A key issue was 
therefore "whether we had the political strategy to give the 
military plan the space to work". On that point Jack Straw 
pointed out that there could be USIUK differences. But 
"despite US resistance we should explore discreetly the 
ultimatum." The Defence Secretary agreed, and said Blair 
would have to work on Bush directly to bring him round to 
"the political strategy" - meaning to go back to the Security 
C:ouncil for a decision on an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein. 
The conclusions to the meeting were to work on the 
assumption of UK participation in any military action. No 
firm decisions could be taken yet, but there were three 
options, ranging from putting bases at the disposal for the 
Americans, through participation with naval and air forces, to 
a land force contribution of up to 40,000 men. The Foreign 
Secretary would in the meantime continue to work on "the 
ultimatum", while the Attorney General would continue to 
explore the legal issues. 
The implications of that meeting were clear. Britain and the 
United States were in agreement on the need to go for regime 
change in Iraq through armed force, but were not yet agreed 
on the political strategy to legalise or legitimise such action. 
Here Britain would have to convince the Bush administration 
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that a Security Council ultimatum was needed. If Saddam then 
refused to readmit the UN inspectors, or continued his usual 
tactic of obstruction or playing for time, then that should clear 
the way for military action legalised by the United Nations. 
The stage was thus set for the political process which led to 
Security Council Resolution 1441, with its offer to Iraq of "a 
final opportunity to comply with its disarmament 
obligations" . 
Resolution 1441, however, SOon became the object of 
different interpretations. Those who were opposed to militarv 
action seemed to regard it as meaning that a new process of 
inspections would ultimately result in the removal of most if 
not all WMD. The US and Britain, on the other hand, saw the 
intent of the resolution as being to compel once and for all an 
end to the conflict with Iraq over proscribed weapons 
activities, not to initiate another period of indefinite 
containment. Therefore, unless Saddam made a strategic 
decision to disarm, he would have to be disarmed by force. A 
decision by Saddam to disarm, however, would mean the 
lifting of sanctions, which would then provide him with 
resources to resume his WMD programmes. A regime change 
was therefore necessary. The British government did not 
claim, as the Bush administration did, that Saddam's Iraq 
represented an imminent threat against other than the Iraqi 
people. Their threat assessment had three main elements: 
Saddam's record of aggression; his possession, programmes of 
development, and record of use of WMD; and the risk that 
states with WMD might in the future work with terrorists. 
Those who were adamantly opposed to military action 
against Iraq, in Britain and elsewhere, failed throughout to 
offer an alternative approach to the problem. Although they 
seemed to believe that a prolonged UNMOVIC inspection 
programme would succeed in finding and eliminating stocks 
and production facilities for WMD, they had no answer to the 
question of what would happen in Iraq once sanctions were 
lifted - how then to stop Saddam's human rights abuses 
against his own population, or prevent his resumption of 
WMD development? Therefore: "In reality, the full force of 
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the argument for military action rested not on the threat itself, 
but on the absence of an acceptable alternative and the 
consequences of permitting Saddam Hussein to remain in 
,,039 power. -
The clash between Colin Powell and de Villepin in the 
Security Council on 5 February 2003 demonstrated that the 
positions of the main protagonists had hardened. Secretary of 
State Colin Powell's dramatic speech, echoing in many ways 
President Bush's State of the Union address a week earlier, 
asserted among other things that Iraq possessed mobile 
bacteriological weapons laboratories, as well as unmanned 
aircraft that might be used to deliver such weapons. Neither 
speech reflected "the many doubts that had surfaced at that 
time about Iraq's weapons programs" .240 By this time, 
however, it had become a question of lining up support for or 
against military action. On 10 February French president 
Chirac, Russian president Putin and German chancellor 
Schroeder issued a joint statement calling for continued 
inspections in Iraq. Twelve days later, on 22 February, 
president Bush played host to Spain's Prime Minister Aznar on 
his Crawford ranch in Texas. After telephone conversations 
with Tony Blair, and with Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, 
they all agreed to seek a second Security Council resolution to 
declare that Saddam had failed to comply with resolurion 
1441. There then ensued a scramble -likened by one observer 
to "a diplomatic opera of odd courtships, arm-twisting, 
compromises and back-room deal-making,,241 - to win over 
the other Security Council members. On 9 March Colin 
Powell claimed in a television interview that he thought he 
might get the nine or ten votes necessary for a two-thirds 
majority, although so far only Spain and Bulgaria were 
committed to supporting a US-British resolution. A two-thirds 
majority would compel France either to use the veto against 
139 Bluth, "'The British Road to War. .. ", p. RS5. 
240 Walrer Pincus, "Prc-war Findings Worried Analysts". Washillgton Post 
22 Ivlay 2005. 
241 Tom Zeller in the New York Times, 16 March 1003, as quoted by Mats 
Berdal in his article "The UN Security Council: Ineffective but 
indispensable", Surl'ipal, vot 45, no. 2 (2003): 20. 
128 FORSVARSSTUDIER 41200S 
three of its allies, or to abstain. But calls by Bush to Mexico 
and Chile failed to produce the desired answers. Chirac in the 
meantime successfully persuaded the three African members to 
remain on his side. So, on 16 March the leaders of the 
coalition for war, Bush, Blair and Aznar, gave up the effort for 
a second resolution. From their mini-summit in the Azores 
they declared that Resolution 1441 had given them the 
necessary authority to act with armed force against an Iraq 
that had failed to disarm. All that remained then was for the 
Americans to set the date for commencing the invasion. 
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Epilogue 
At the outset of this study we posed the question of whether 
weapons of mass destruction were the real issue between the 
international community and Iraq. Our answer has to be that 
those weapons were the real issue, in the sense that if Iraq had 
disarmed itself once and for all of those weapons, the 
international community's case against Iraq would have 
vanished. But was there ever a realistic possibility of such a 
unilateral disarmament? With the advantage of hindsight, it 
may seem as if the effort of the United Nations Security 
Council to obtain such a result, through sanctions and 
intrusive inspections, was a "mission impossible". If Sad dam 
Hussein had been a rational actor, and if he had his country 
and people's best interests as his aim, getting rid of weapons 
of mass destruction in return for the end of sanctions and a 
chance to rebuild Iraq would have seemed a fair exchange. But 
national pride and personal prestige stood in the way. The 
regime also saw weapons of mass destruction as essential to 
their survival - not least against Iran. In the early 1990s they 
probably also thought they could get away with not declaring 
everything and still obtain the lifting of sanctions. 
The coalition that defeated Saddam in Kuwait and then 
formed the majority in the UN Security Council, on the other 
hand, had several reasons for insisting that their demands be 
met. Having invested so much time, effort and prestige in 
seeking the removal of Iraq's WMD, they could not 
reasonably be expected to back down and just leave Saddam 
Hussein free to reconstitute his deadly arsenal, which they 
feared could be used for future aggression against his 
neighbours. The reputation of the UN and the Secutity 
Council was also at stake. Not again, as too many times 
before, could the UN countenance a blatant defiance of its 
authority. 
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In the prolonged stalemate that ensued, cracks began to 
appear in the initially solid resolve of the leading members of 
the Security Council. Some, perhaps less worried abour 
Saddam as a threat since he had been "taught a lesson" in 
1991, or less concerned about the authority of the UN, or 
eager to resume profitable business relations with an oil-rich 
country, would like the problem of Iraq simply to go away, 
perhaps through a face-saving compromise of one kind or 
another. For others, and particularly those who had borne the 
brunt of the armed struggle in the Gulf War, any kind of 
"appeasement" compromise that would leave Iraq at liberty to 
rearm with weapons of mass destruction was out of the 
question. 
In Baghdad, as time went by, the leaders of the Iraqi regime 
became more and more convinced that the sanctions regime 
would not be completely lifted as long as they or Saddam 
Hussein remained in power. They therefore pinned their hopes 
on a gradual erosion of the sanctions regime under the 
pressure of international public opinion. But while Saddam 
Hussein seemed determined to defy the demands of repeated 
Security Council resolutions, the hard liners in the Council 
became increasingly concerned about the fact there was more 
to it than just the existence or absence of stockpiles of WMD. 
The Iraqi regime's record of lies, evasions, and obstruction of 
the UN inspectors, as well as its history of aggression and use 
of WMD, meant that they needed to be convinced that Iraq 
would not in one, two or three years resume efforts to acquire 
such weapons. That raised the wider question of weapons 
programmes, of dual-use facilities and - in the last resort - of 
trust concerning the Iraqi regime's intentions. And, given its 
past record, how could the international community trust 
Saddam Hussein's regime? The fact is that no one did. 
An intriguing question, based on information that has 
come to light after the war, is whether the pervasive distrust of 
the Iraqi regime was towards the end based on an inadequate 
understanding of its decision-making process. The revelations 
of the Iraq Survey Group, in particular, suggest that the 
assumptions about an orderly monolithic structure with an 
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all-powerful Saddam Hussein in control did not correspond 
with the situation, especially during the last six months. 
Internal disagreements, and the lack of precise and consistent 
instructions from the top, may therefore have reinforced 
international suspicions of the regime's continuing 
prevarication in complying with UN demands. 
The role of intelligence was throughout of crucial 
importance to western perceptions of the evolving conflict. In 
spite of - and in some sense because of - a scarcity of reliable 
sources, particularly after the departure of UNSCOM from 
Iraq, the western intelligence agencies estimated till the end 
that Iraq did possess weapons of mass destruction as well as 
programmes for their development. Caveats abour the 
uncertain basis of some of their assessments tended to fall by 
the wavside. In any case the political decision-makers in both 
the United States and - to a lesser extent - in the United 
Kingdom "cherry-picked" the intelligence estimates that 
seemed best suited to engender support for their plan of 
action. 
The unanimous vote in favour of Resolution 1441, in 
October 2002, appeared like a victory for the hardliners. At 
last the consensus around giving Iraq a really "final 
opportunity" to disarm had been restored. If Iraq now 
complied, under the threat of "serious consequences" bat:ked 
by a massive military build-up, the international community's 
perseverance would be vindicated. But did anyone really 
believe that Iraq in such a short time would be able to fulfil 
the terms of the resolution? In reality, nothing had changed. 
Behind the carefully crafted wording of Resolution 1441 the 
old divisions remained. The January 2003 threat of a French 
veto, against a second resolution explicitly authorising armed 
force against Iraq, demonstrared that the ultimate basic issue 
- whether the United Nations should act on the words and 
meaning of all its resolutions and demands, or whether the 
international community should settle for a half-way 
compromise and simply hope that this time Iraq would in 
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practice put its WMD ambitions to rest - was still unresolved. 
On that crossroads the Security Council became deadlocked 
on 17 March 2003. 
As this is being written, the ultimate outcome of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath is still in the future. Any 
conclusions on the larger question, of the justification Or 
otherwise for the war, would therefore be premature. Those 
who supported the war will still argue that, while the ongoing 
violence, unrest, and political confusion soon blotted out the 
euphoria of the first days after the fall of Saddam's regime, the 
final outcome as and when the Iraqi people take control of 
their own country will vindicate the decision to go to war to 
remove a brutal, oppressive and aggressive regime. Those who 
were adamantly against going to war will point to the ongoing 
violence, and the threat of a full-scale civil war in Iraq, as 
confirming their view that the use of armed force against Iraq 
was not a solution. In between will be found those who would 
have supported or acquiesced in a war if authorised and 
therefore legitimised by the United Nations Security Council, 
assuming that the United Nations would thereby also have 
played a leading role in the transition from war to peace. 
Behind all the alternative answers lies the hypothetical 
question which will never be answered: What would the 
situation have been for the people of Iraq, for the region, and 
for the United Nations for that matter, with the Saddam 
Hussein regime still in power, and with the sanctions in all 
likelihood removed? 
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